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Ralph Slovenko*
1. IN GENERAL
There are two types of juries: the grand jury, the jury of
accusation; and the petit jury, the jury of conviction.' The grand
jury is primarily an agency to determine whether or not the evi-
dence is sufficient to warrant prosecutive action. The petit jury
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and renders a
verdict accordingly. 2
The jury system is one of the great "sacred cows" of the
common law. The grand and petit jury, one of the ancient Eng-
lish institutions, came to be regarded, in the struggle of the
people for their civil rights and liberties, as a barrier against
persecution in the name of the crown.3 The grand jury was an
assembly of a number of neighbors for the purpose of starting
the prosecution of crimes with which the neighborhood was
*Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. See generally LA. R.S. 15:172-215 (1950).
2. This English common law method of prosecution was carried into our con-
stitutions. The Federal Constitution provides for the concurrence of these two
juries in order to convict a person. The Fifth Amendment provides that no per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Article 3, Section 2, provides that
the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and the
Sixth Amendment states that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed.
The Fifth Amendment as to the federal government and the Fourteenth
Amendment as to the state governments, provide that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without "due process of law." Punishment for crime
is always deprivation of life, liberty, or property. However, "due process" has
been held not to include the necessity that the accusation be made by a grand
jury, Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), or that the trial be by jury,
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). As stated by Justice Cardozo: "Consistent
with that amendment trial by jury may be abolished." Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also In re Ross, 38 La. Ann. 523 (1886). Hence,
the right to the grand or petit jury is protected only by the specific provisions
in the federal and state constitutions and statutes. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
3. See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1955). As to the development of the grand jury as
an institution here and in England, see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43. (1906) ; 4
BL. Comm. 301 et seq.; 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
130 (1895) ; 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-23 (1903) ; Glaser,
The Political and Historical Development of the Grand Jury, 8 LAW Soc. J. 192
(1938) ; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 295 (1931).
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familiar by observation or reputation. The jury of accusation
at common law was called the grand jury because it was a big
twenty-three, 4 while the trial jury was a petty twelve. 5 In the
beginning the trial judge placed the question of the truth of the
charge to the accusing jury, or to part of it, or to it with added
members, which body was then not to make an accusation but to
speak the truth, that is to say, to render a verdict, concerning
the accusation already made. After a time, the mixture of the
grand jury and the trial jury was not permitted. The accused
was allowed to object to a trial juror who sat upon the grand
jury which considered the cause, and to have him dismissed.
This practice produced a completely separate trial jury, which,
with its number ultimately settled at twelve, was the common
law petty or petit jury.6
2. GRAND JURY
Power of Grand Jury
The grand jury from its beginning had inquisitorial power
and at one time even some trial power. At times the grand jury
served as a protection against arbitrary government, but fortu-
nately we Americans have had few occasions for such protec-
tion. 7 This age-old institution, despite criticisms, has been re-
tained in our constitution and laws, in the belief that it is a
beneficent element in the official machinery of justice. The
grand jury is presently an essential part of the judicial power,
for one accused of a capital crime (a felony in federal courts)
cannot be prosecuted except upon a true bill returned by a grand
jury.
The court controls the grand jury to the extent that it or-
ganizes and determines the legality of its proceedings. The
members of the grand jury are subject to the court's supervision
and control for any violation of their duties.8 Beyond this super-
4. The number of grand jurors was variable at common law, but could not
exceed twenty-three nor be less than twelve. To distinguish this accusatory body
from the small, or "petit" juries that functioned in the individual cases, they were
known as the large, or in Norman French, the "grand" jury.
5. The word "petty," as here used, should be taken to mean small in nature
or diminutive, and not trifling or insignificant.
6. See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 122 (4th ed.
1948) ; SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67 (1953).
7. See Franklin, Infamy and Constitutional Civil Liberties, 14 LAWYERS GUILD
REV. 1 (1954).
8. State ex rel. DeArmas v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1939).
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visory power, however, the court cannot limit the grand jury
in its legitimate investigation of alleged violations of the law.
The term "legitimate investigation" remains to be defined.
In federal criminal procedure the grand jury's powers are
not defined by statute, and it has remained for the courts to
determine the extent of the grand jury's power to investigate
crime.9 The Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law
Institute recommends that the grand jury be allowed to inquire
into every public offense triable within its jurisdiction for which
a charge has not already been filed. 10 In contrast, the redactors
of the 1928 Louisiana Code, in considering the scope of grand
jury investigations, followed a policy of not giving the grand
jury general inquisitorial powers. Article 209 of the 1928 Code
states that the grand jury is to investigate non-capital offenses
triable within the parish only when called to their attention by
the district attorney or the court. Furthermore, the grand jury
was no longer to act as a censory body of public morals. The
grand jury was given power only to return a true bill or a no-
true bill, or, if it chose, to take no action at all.1 Its power to
make reports or recommendations was limited to certain desig-
nated institutions. 1
The limitation adopted in 1928 on the general inquisitorial
power of the grand jury has been modified. The legislature has
integrated into the 1950 Revised Statutes an old 1870 provision
which provides that any member of the grand jury is required,
under penalty 'of law, to bring to the attention of his fellow
members any violation of the criminal law which may have come
to his personal knowledge, or of which he may have been in-
formed.13 In effect, the integration of the 1870 provision was
simply an adoption of the jurisprudence. Applying the 1870
provision, which was not expressly superseded by the 1928 Code,
and the pre-codal jurisprudence relating thereto, the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that the grand jury could return an in-
dictment regardless of how the information on which it acted
9. See Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; Dressen
& Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687 (1932) ;
Kennedy & Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand Jury
System, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 251 (1955) ; Note, 30 TUL. ,. REV. 323 (1956).
10. ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 132 provides that the grand jury "shall in-
quire into every offense triable within the county which are presented to them by
the prosecuting attorney or otherwise come to their knowledge."
11. LA. R.S. 15:210 (1950).
12. Id. 15:210-211. See State ex rel. DeArmas v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So.
659 (1939).
13. LA. R.S. 15:209.1 (1950).
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came to its attention.14 A holding that the grand jury is legally
considered to have knowledge of a crime when informed by a
grand juror or any individual citizen,' 5 coupled with the fact
that prescription commences from the time the grand jury has
knowledge of the offense,' 6 justifies the view that 'the grand
jury may originate investigations and file charges against al-
leged offenders of the law on its own motion.' 7
A possible limitation on the grand jury's investigative power
is the witness' privilege against self-incrimination. 8 Moreover,
14. State v. Richey, 195 La. 319, 196 So. 545 (1940). See State v. Vial, 153
La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923). See also State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 420, 175 So. 4,
14 (1937).
15. Apparently any person has the right to bring information of a crime before
the grand jury. See State v. Johnson, 116 La. 856, 41 So. 117 (1906) ; State v.
Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 14 So. 117 (1893). See also The Times-Picayune,
April 21, 1956, p. 1, col. 1 (private citizen cannot act as legal adviser). Direct
communication with the grand jury by private complainants is prohibited in most
states, and even where permitted, it is sometimes discouraged by the threat of a
contempt citation for wasting the jury's time. See People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524,
30 N.E.2d 11 (1940) ; Hitzellerger v. State, 173 Md. 435, 196 At]. 288 (1938)
State v. Love, 23 Tenn. 255 (1843).
16. See LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
17. Judge George P. Platt of the criminal district court, in swearing in
the grand jury for Orleans Parish on March 5, 1956, charged the new panel in the
following manner: "You are to investigate such matters as may be called to your
attention by the court or submitted by the district attorney, or that may come to
your knowledge in the course of your investigation of matters brought to you or
from your own observations. . . . As a general rule, I advise you to decline to
examine complaints unless some satisfactory reason be given or appears for it pot
being placed before the court by affidavit or information by the district attorney."
New Orleans States, March 5, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.
18. LA. CONST. art. I. § 11, provides: "No person shall b$ compelled to give
evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject
him to criminal prosecution." An indictment will be invalidated upon a showing
that the defendant was called before the grand jury to give evidence and testified
without being first advised of his privilege against self incrimination. In State v.
Harrell, 228 La. 434, 82 So.2d 701 (1955), the defendant, while in custody on a
charge of murder, was taken before the grand jury for interrogation about the
crime, without his request to be heard. le was not advised of his privilege against
self incrimination and he was without the advice of counsel. Ile stated that he had
shot the deceased in self defense. A motion to quash the indictment was made
on the ground that the defendant's privilege against self incrimination had been
violated. The state admitted that, had the defendant been ordered to testify about
the homicide over his express desire not to give evidence, the indictment would
without doubt be a nullity, but it argued that the rule is different where an ac-
cused volunteers the self-incriminating testimony. The state further contended that,
since the accused predicated his entire defense at the trial upon a plea of self
defense, he could not have been prejudiced in any way by his appearance before
the grand jury. The Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, held that an inter-
rogation which fails to advise the defendant of his privilege against self incrimina-
tion is tantamount to obtaining his testimony through compulsion, in violation of
his constitutional rights, and an indictment which is grounded, in whole or in part,
on evidence secured in violation of a constitutional right, is an absolute nullity.
See also State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So.2d 12 (1955), which held that
the privilege against self incrimination, notwithstanding a grant of immunity,
exonerates from disclosure whenever there is a probability of incrimination in
another jurisdiction.
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the public prosecutor's broad power to nolle prosequi the grand
jury's indictments also serves as a possible limitation on its
inquisitorial power. 19 Because the grand jury cannot compel the
district attorney to prosecute the case (the most it can do is
urge him to act), the grand jury as a matter of practice limits
its investigations to those cases presented to it by the prosecutor
and the court.
Evidence to Justify an Indictment
The grand jury is justified in returning an indictment when
the evidence, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would in its
judgment warrant a conviction by the trial jury.20 To deter-
mine whether there has been a violation of the law, the grand
jury has the right to subpoena and to have persons and docu-
ments called before it. 2 1 However, since the function of the
grand jury is to decide whether proceedings shall be taken and
is not to pass on disputed facts, the grand jury can, if it wishes,
hear and consider only the evidence for the prosecution in deter-
mining whether there is probable cause to believe the accused to
be guilty. The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence in be-
half of the accused. Indeed, as stated above, an indictment may
be based on knowledge of facts of the grand jury members only,
and without having any witnesses summoned. However, as a
matter of principle, the grand jury ought to weigh all relevant
evidence submitted to it and not to rest satisfied with remote
possibilities. 22
The requirement that an indictment be supported by suf-
ficient evidence is designed to protect the accused from the
burden and expense of an unnecessary public trial and its ac-
companying unfavorable publicity. The Code declares that in
the investigation of crime the grand jury can receive none but
legal evidence, but the court has held that the provision is di-
rectory, rather than mandatory, in nature and affords no basis
for a review of the evidence on which the indictment was based.2 8
19. Court assent is not required before the prosecutor can enter a nolle prosequi.
See LA. R.S. 15:329 (1950).
20. The quantum of evidence on which grand jurors must rest their conclu-
sions in returning indictments is not within the control of the courts. State v.
Lewis, 38 La. Ann. 680 (1886).
21. LA. R.S. 15:214 (1950).
22. Ibid. Accord, ALI CODE OF CRIMi. PROC. § 139.
23. LA. R.S. 15:213 (1950). In State v. Simpson, 216 La. 212, 43 So.2d 585(1949), the defendant sought to challenge the nature and legality of the evidence
upon which the grand jury had returned an indictment. Initially defense counsel
filed a bill of particulars seeking full information as to the evidence that went
before the grand jury, including a specific question as to whether the defendant's
19571
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The decision is justified in theory and practice. Although trial
court evidence standards would implement the grand jury's func-
tion of protecting the accused citizen, the rules of the trial court
are not necessarily appropriate to a grand jury proceeding. The
purpose of the grand jury's investigation is not to pass on guilt
or innocence, but to determine whether there is probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. Pro-
bative and relevant evidence, even though technically incom-
petent, can furnish a rational ground for assuming the possi-
bility that the accused is guilty. By excluding illegal evidence
which is relevant and probative, the rules may actually hinder
the grand jury's function. The hearsay rule is illustrative.
Hearsay is not inherently irrelevant or non-probative, as is evi-
denced by the many exceptions to the rule. Lack of cross-ex-
amination is the primary basis for the exclusion of hearsay in
the trial court; cross-examination, however, is not available as
part of the grand jury procedure to test any evidence.2 4
The indictment procedure makes the evidence rules of the
trial court inappropriate to the grand jury proceedings. Since
controversial confession was placed before the grand jury. The bill of particulars
was refused. Later, defense counsel's motion to quash the indictment was over-
ruled by the trial judge. Affirming the ruling, the Supreme Court held that Article
213 is directory in nature, and cannot be used as the basis of a technical review
of the evidence which was produced before the grand jury. The grand jury pro-
ceeding merely ascertains whether there is a sufficient prima facie case to justify
charging a crime and is quite different from the actual trial of the case, where the
rules of evidence are in force. See also State v. Dallno, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4
(1937) (indictment based solely on private knowledge of grand jurors) ; The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term--Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 233, 243 (1951).
24. In 1.852 Mr. Justice Nelson on circuit said in United States v. Reed, 27
Fed. Cas. 728, 738: "No case has been cited, nor have we been able to find any,
furnishing an authority for looking into and revising the judgment of the grand
jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding
was founded upon sufficient proof."
In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361 (1956), all the evidence before
the grand jury was in the nature of hearsay. Upholding the indictment, the United
States Supreme Court said: "The Fifth Amendment provides that federal prosecu-
tions for capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be instituted by presentments
or indictments of grand juries. But neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other
constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries
must act. . . . If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground
that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the re-
sulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that be-
fore trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary
trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand
jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a
legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the
prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the
merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more." See Notes, 62 IIAav. L.
REV. 111, 114-15 (1948); 104 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1955); 65 YALE L.J. '390
(1956).
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the accused does not have the right to testify or to present evi-
dence at the grand jury proceeding, it follows that he cannot
complain that the indictment was based on insufficient evidence
or on no evidence at all.2 5 Even should the court inquire into
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence adduced before the
grand jury, the defendant is confronted with the obstacles of
discovery. Since the grand jury sessions are secret, and since
the jurors are incompetent as witnesses to impeach the indict-
ment, there is no one as a practical matter to support the objec-
tion that illegal evidence was received .2  The accused does not
have the right to be present at the grand jury proceeding. At
the hearing, the only persons normally present, besides the grand
jurors themselves, are the particular witness who is being heard
and the prosecuting attorney, who, as legal adviser, has free
access to the sessions of the grand jury.27 In addition, the dis-
trict attorney can permit a stenographer to take minutes of
the proceedings, and the grand jury can avail itself of an inter-
preter to translate the testimony of a witness. 28 Three of these
four individuals, the district attorney, the stenographer, and
the translator, are, like the jurors themselves, sworn to the
secrecy of the proceedings, 29 and the stenographic minutes of
25. See State v. Britton, 131 La. 877, 60 So. 379 (1912). FED. R. CRIm. P.
6(d) provides that the defendant is not entitled to be present when witnesses
appear before a federal grand jury.
26. See State v. Britton, 131 La. 877, 60 So. 379 (1912).
27. The district attorney and his advisers are the legal advisers of the grandjury, and may be present at, and assist the jurors in, their examination of cases,
provided the district attorney does not take part in their deliberations as to their
conclusions and findings. See LA. R.S. 15:215 (1950) ; State ex rel. DeArmas v.
Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1940) ; State v. Aleck, 41 La. Ann. 83, 5 So.
639 (1889).
28. Ibid.
29. LA. R.S. 15:204, 15:215 (1950). See State v. Hopkins, 115 La. 786, 40 So.
166 (1906). See also State v. Perry, 149 La. 1065, 90 So. 406 (1921) ; State v.
Britton, 131 La. 877, 60 So. 379 (1912). However, when a witness upon the trial
testifies differently from what he did before the grand jury, the grand jurors, or
the district attorney, stenographer, or interpreter may inform the judge, who may
cause the witness to be prosecuted for perjury. See State v. Wood, 53 N.H. 484
(1873). ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 145 provides: "No grand juror, prosecuting
attorney, stenographer or interpreter shall disclose the testimony of a witness ex-
amined before the grand jury or other evidence received by it except when required
by a court to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury
or other evidence received by it except when required by a court to disclose the
testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether it is consistent with that of the witness given before the court,
or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any person upon a
charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial
thereof, or when permitted by the court in the furtherance of justice." Moreover,
no secrecy is imposed upon a witness before a grand jury either as to the fact that
he has testified or as to the testimony given by him. See People v. Minet, 296
N.Y. 315, 73 N.E.2d 529 (1947). Although evidence before the grand jury to sus-
tain an indictment should be legal and competent, an indictment is not vitiated
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the proceedings are not accessible to the defendant or other in-
terested parties.3 0 Under these circumstances, the only method
available to the accused to discover what transpired and who
testified is to inquire of the witnesses at the trial.3 1 There is no
requirement, however, for the endorsement of the names of wit-
nesses appearing before the grand jury to be made on the in-
dictment.
Secrecy of Proceedings
A policy of secrecy exists in regard to grand jury proceed-
ings. Various purposes are served by secret proceedings 32 The
grand jury may investigate and find nothing worthy of indict-
ment; secrecy serves to protect the good name of the person
under scrutiny. A disclosure that a person is under investiga-
tion will certainly besmirch his reputation. This purpose of
secrecy, however, really applies only when the grand jury is the
first body to act in the case. The reason most often announced
for the policy of secrecy is that the defendant has no right to
the secrets of the prosecution's case in advance. Secrecy is im-
posed so that an unscrupulous defendant will not be allowed to
go on a "fishing expedition" of the evidence available to the
prosecution and thereby be put in a position to build up a
perjured defense.
There are other reasons which justify secret proceedings:
to avoid the danger of the escape of the accused before his
arrest when the case is initiated by jury action; to insure against
judicial control of the grand jury; to secure to a witness the
utmost freedom of disclosure of alleged crimes; and to promote
that freedom of deliberation, expression of opinion and of ac-
tion among the grand jurors which would be impaired if the
part taken by each might be disclosed to the accused or to
because the grand jury examined incompetent witnesses, or considered improper
evidence, or required an ordinary witness to give improper evidence, e.g., to testify
against himself. Indeed, it is impracticable to receive testimony that a grand jury
has acted on insufficient or improper evidence, since the jurors themselves may
inform one another, or come to their conclusions in other ways. See State v.
Britton, 131 La. 877, 60 So. 379 (1912) ; State v. Lewis, 38 La. Ann. 680 (1886).
See also Washington v. State, 63 Ala. 189 (1879).
30. LA. R.S. 15:215 (1950). See State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4
(1937) ; PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 120 (1953).
31. Cf. State v. Harrell, 228 La. 434, 82 So.2d 701 (1955) (violation of priv-
ilege against self incrimination), discussed note 18 supra.
32. See Commonwealth v. Mead, 12 Gray 167 (Mass. 1858); In re Kittle,
180 Fed. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) ; Note, 16 FORD. L. REV. 131 (1947).
[Vol. XVII
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others."3 In accordance with this policy, the oath administered
to grand jurors, established by common law usage, ancient and
modern, and prescribed by Article 204, contains this clause:
"that he [each of the grand jurors] will keep secret his own
counsel, that of his fellows and that of the state."
Effect of No-True Bill
The finding of a no-true bill presents no right to interpose a
plea of former acquittal or res judicata at a subsequent grand
jury hearing or at the trial of the case on the later true bill or
on an information.3 4 A grand jury investigation is an ex parte
proceeding. The proceeding is not a trial for the determination
of guilt or innocence. The grand jury has essentially only one
function to perform: to report to the court that it has reasonable
cause to believe that probable grounds exist or do not exist for
the violation of the law. Indeed the trial judge has the duty to
charge the petit jury sitting at the trial that a true bill returned
by the grand jury carries no evidence and creates no presump-
tion of guilt; the judge must charge the jury that the defendant
33. See Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1927). The veil
of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings was lifted in United States v.
Proctor & Gamble-Co., 19 F.R.D. 122 (D.C.N.J. 1956). After grand jury investi-
gations concerning possible violation of the anti-trust laws, the matter was dropped
and no indictment was returned, but the United States then brought a civil ac-
tion under the Sherman Act. The defendants moved to compel the government to
produce and permit the inspection and copying of the grand jury transcripts on the
ground that the government had used the facts contained in the transcripts to
gain an unfair advantage over the defendants who had been unable to use such
facts in preparing for trial. The judge summarized the reasons for the rule of
secrecy as follows: "(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from im-
portuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering
with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at
the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled dis-
closures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial
where there was no probability of guilt." The court then said that the first two
reasons clearly did not apply since the grand jury had been discharged without
returning an indictment and that the fifth reason was not applicable since it was
the corporations themselves who had moved for production of the transcripts. The
court rejected the third ground on the theory that such possibility was not so
great a danger as the danger of surprise. As to the fourth reason, the court said
that after the grand jury had been discharged the temporary guaranty of secrecy
ended and remarked that a contrary rule would create an opportunity for abuse
by a corrupt witness who could testify falsely without fear of his lies being re-
vealed to public scrutiny and reaction. Grand jury minutes were also revealed for
use in a subsequent civil action in United States v. Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F.
Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955), 42 VA. L. REV. 581 (1956).
34. State v. Ross, 14 La. Ann. 364 (1859) (information can be filed notwith-
standing return of no-true bill).
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is presumed to be innocent, and that the presumption will con-
trol unless guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A true
bill cannot be used as evidence to establish the guilt of the ac-
cused; similarly, a no-true bill has no effect on a subsequent ac-
cusation. However, being public, the return of a no-true bill
serves in a way to exonerate the accused.
Criticism of Grand Jury
The desirability of a grand jury indictment has been ques-
tioned for many years. As early as 1825, Jeremy Bentham, in
his "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," insisted that the grand
jury, as an institution, had then been unnecessary and of no
value for fully a quarter of a century. There has been a definite
tendency to abolish the grand jury. The grand jury was elimi-
nated in England in 1933, as a useless relic; and in a number
of American states, grand juries have similarly been abolished. 85
Even in the states which retain the grand jury, it is generally
bypassed by the use of the prosecutor's information. The Ameri-
can Law Institute has recommended that the requirement of an
indictment by a grand jury for any offense be eliminated. The
same conclusion was reached by the New York Crime Commis-
sion. Bentham's contention that the grand jury has been per-
forming no useful function since the beginning of modern prose-
cution has been the keystone of the argument against the grand
jury system.
In the era of royal despotism, the grand jury was looked upon
as an institution to protect the people against the deprivation
of their liberties by restricting and preventing unbridled royal
prosecutions carried on through the instrumentality of sub-
servient royal judges. It is now said that, in spite of or in
ignorance of the rise of totalitarianism in the twentieth century,
the grand jury is no longer needed as a check against the state.8 6
It is suggested that the trial courts and trial juries, together with
other community institutions, are quite capable of protecting the
rights of the people. Those who would improve the administra-
35. See Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29 J. CalM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1938) ; Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 id. 214
(1955). For criticisms of the grand jury as serving no useful purpose, see Morse,
.A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 295, 329 (1931). But see
Dession, From Indictment to Information -- Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE
L.J. 163 (1932) ; White, In Defense of the Grand Jury, 25 PA. B.A.Q. 260 (1954).
36. See CLEMENTS, COMMENTS, CASES AND TEXT ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE 734 (1952); DIENSTEIN, ARE YOU GUILTY? 100 (1954); Younger, The
Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 26 (1955).
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tion of justice allege the need for improvement in the jury
system to be as vital as that which inspired the procedural
changes embodied in the civil and criminal codes of recent years.
It is charged that the grand jury often does little more than
rubber-stamp the opinion of the district attorney, its legal ad-
viser. In actual practice, the prosecutor usually draws up the
indictment. The grand jury is almost exclusively dependent upon
him for both the law and the facts and its conclusions are cus-
tomarily his. 37 Because of the district attorney's extensive power
to prosecute or not to prosecute,3 8 the jurors cainot make ef-
fective inroads on his accusatorial discretion. Furthermore, it
is undeniable that grand juries encumber and delay the admin-
istration of the criminal law, that grand juries involve large
expenditures of funds,39 and that grand juries are sometimes
pressured by dominant groups.40
Such criticism of the grand jury, however, does not neces-
sarily mean that the grand jury is not or cannot be an important
democratic institution. Among other things, the grand jury is
or can be an effective voice of the people as a general investi-
gating body for inquiring into the acts of public officials,
whether it be general lawlessness, or a faithless discharge of
official duties. 41 The grand jury, rather than be abolished, can
be effectively employed to police the conduct of public officials.
42
37. See POUND & FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 212 (1922).
The district attorney, however, is prohibited from taking part in the deliberations
of the grand jury as to their conclusions and findings. State v. Aleck, 41 La. Ann.
83, 5 So. 639 (1889).
38. For a discussion of the prosecutor's accusatorial discretion, see Note, 103 U.
PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955).
39. There is great expense also in requiring witnesses to attend two preliminary
hearings, one before the judge in a preliminary examination and one before the
grand jury. This requirement of repeated attendance of witnesses discourages wit-
nesses and not infrequently leads to no prosecution where one ought to go forward.
It is possible, however, as we have seen, for the grand jury to be the first body to
act in a particular case, thus by-passing preliminary examination. A warrant will
then issue for the defendant's arrest.
40. See Hall, Analysis of Criticisms of the Grand Jury, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 692 (1932) ; Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV.
119 (1931). See also HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 651
(1951).
41. See The Times-Picayune, March 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 4, concerning the in-
dictment of a state representative for public bribery.
42. See Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV.
379 (1924). The American Law Institute has recommended that the grand jury
be retained as an occasional instrument for such purposes, but that the require-
ment of it as a basis of prosecution, even for the more serious crimes, be abolished.
Section 113 of the ALI Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "all offenses
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted either by
indictment of information." Under Section 114: "No grand jury shall be sum-
moned to attend at any court except upon the order of a judge thereof when In
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Grand juries appear better suited than legislative or executive
committees or private bodies for such a task. The combination of
subpoena power and secrecy permits testimony to be taken with
minimum embarrassment and with minimum risk of reprisals to
the subpoenaed witnesses. The jurors, non-professional, ordi-
narily are not dually engaged in both investigating the miscon-
duct of public officials and in promoting their own careers.
The grand jury in Louisiana is authorized to conduct periodic
investigations into the public institutions of the area in its juris-
diction. The grand jury is to inspect every prison, place of de-
tention, asylum, and hospital within the parish and to report
its findings to the district judge.43 The grand jury is to deter-
mine how well these institutions are being run and to look into
conditions that may reflect upon the enforcement of the law or
the management of the institutions.
3. THE PETIT JURY
Function
For historical reasons, trial by jury in criminal cases has
been regarded as a protection to the individual citizen against
oppressive laws or oppressive enforcement of law. The petit
jury, or the convicting jury as it may be called, was thought so
important a safeguard to the rights of the individual that the
Constitutions of the United States44 and Louisiana45 specifically
provide that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury."
America, colonized by Englishmen who suffered under seven-
teenth century legislation and law enforcement under the
Stuarts, thought of the jury as a bulwark against royal tyranny.
Again, on the eve of the American Revolution, the local jury in
the colonies was considered as a safeguard against enforcement
of repugnant legislation by royal governors. From the beginning,
then, Americans have thought of the jury in terms of the seven-
teenth century contests between the courts and the crown and
his opinion public interest so demands, except that a grand jury shall be summoned
at least once a year in each county." See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST rO APPEAL 178, 184 (1947).
43. LA. R.S. 15:211 (1950).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. "Due process of law" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been held not to include the necessity of a trial by jury. See Snyder V.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), discussed note 2 supra.
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in terms of the eighteenth century contests between the colonies
and royal authority. The petit jury, along with the grand jury,
has been looked upon as a pillar of democratic government.
The present primary function of the trial jury in the process
of administering justice in criminal prosecutions is the ascer-
tainment of the facts. The jury hears the allegations and then
hears the facts presented to substantiate or disprove them. On
the basis of this presentation, and the rulings of law as set forth
by the judge, the jury decides, supposedly without hostility or
sympathy, whether or not the accused committed the act charged
in the manner charged.
Criticism of Petit Jury
Historically considered as a protection against arbitrary
prosecution, the jury was not thought of as an effective tribunal
for the ascertainment of facts in criminal prosecutions. In Eng-
land the jury was not employed originally in the chancery court
or at all in the ecclesiastical courts (indeed, until the last cen-
tury their witnesses were examined out of court). Today, com-
plaints are frequently voiced as to the inefficiency of the jury
system as a fact-finding body.46
A circumstance acting against the efficiency of jury trial is
the inordinate demand upon the time and energy of the citizen
in proper performance of civic duties in the big towns of the
twentieth century. To many citizens of the present-day com-
munity, jury service, rather than a privilege and an honor, is
something to be avoided. Furthermore, the selection of an im-
partial jury panel in important criminal cases has come to be
a difficult task as a result of the advance trial of the case in the
press.47 The practice of challenging jurors takes days in some
parts of the United States. A person who has formed a definite
46. See McCarter, The Jury System: A Twentieth Century View, 4 KAN. L.
REV. 425 (1956). The historian Trevelyan reports that even earlier "the English
jury system, while it protected our liberties, by no means always increased the
fairness of trials." ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS 22 (1949).
Lewis Carroll, in his nonsensical work, The Hunting of tie Snark 42 (1923),
quipped:
"The Jury had each formed a different view
"(Long before the indictment was read),
"And they all spoke at once, so that none of them knew
"One word that the others had said."
47. In England today, newspapers may not editorialize in any fashion upon
pending cases, and in certain types of suits even reporting the evidence presented
at the trial is restricted by statute and rigorous English "custom." See Rex V.
Hutchinson, 155 L.T.R. 455 (K.B. 1936), 23 VA. L. REV. 337.
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opinion previous to the trial can be disqualified from jury serv-
ice, but in our present age of mass communication, it is seldom
that an intelligent person has not formed an opinion regarding
the guilt or innocence of an accused in his community. Conse-
quently, this feudal conscription of laymen results in having
jury service fall to persons who do not have the capacity or
initiative to acquire general and current information. The pres-
ence of the jury, which has largely influenced the development
of the law of evidence, is now said to be one of the principal
obstacles to its reform. Moreover, the weaknesses of the un-
trained jurors are exploited. An attorney who has a weak case
knows that he has a better chance before a jury than before a
judge presiding without a jury. Criminal lawyers are often hired
to defend clients not on their talent in the art of conducting a
trial to ascertain the truth, but for their histrionic ability to be-
fuddle and excite the jury. The professional judge (or a profes-
sional jury) is said to be able to do the work better or, at least,
equally well.
The problem is so well brought out by Sir William Holds-
worth in his work "The History of English Law" that a some-
what lengthy quotation is justified: "The defects of the jury
system are obvious. They are twelve ordinary men --- 'a group
just large enough to destroy even the appearance of individual
responsibility.' They give no reasons for their verdict. The ver-
dict itself is not subject to any appeal; and it is apt, in times of
political excitement, to reflect the popular prejudice of the day.
Experience shows that they are capable of intimidation. It is
said that they are always biased when a pretty woman or a rail-
way company happen to be litigants. Though a good special
jury is admitted to be a very competent tribunal, the common
jury may be composed of persons who have neither the desire
nor the capacity to weigh the evidence, or to arrive at a conclu-
sion upon the facts in issue."
However, Sir Holdsworth immediately adds: "But in spite of
these obvious defects, distinguished judges, who have spent years
working with juries have combined to praise the jury system
.... In fact the jury system works well from the point of view
of the litigant, the judge, the jury itself, and the law. The
litigant gets a body of persons who bring average common
sense to bear upon the facts of the case .... Judges have from
the earliest times appreciated the relief from responsibility
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which the jury system affords them. Not only does the collabora-
tion of the jury relieve the judge from the responsibility of de-
ciding simply upon his own opinion, it also helps him to take,
as the advisor and director of the jury, a more truly judicial
attitude .... The effects of the jury system upon the law are
no less remarkable and no less beneficial. It tends to make the
law intelligible by keeping it in'touch with the common facts of
life. The jury system has for some hundreds of years been con-
stantly bringing the rules of law to the touchstone of contem-
porary common sense .... Judges must explain the law to the
jury. They must separate the rule of law from the question of
fact. This produces both prevision in the statement of the rule,
and a clear outside judgment on the facts. '48
The advocates of the jury system maintain that it assures a
fairer trial to the accused than is the case when one man - the
judge - dictates his fate. Common sense suffices to perform
jury duty; jurors need not be, and should not be, specialists at
trying cases, as they are in some countries. Before a conviction
can be properly brought in, all evidence should be so clear and
incontrovertible that the average citizen, possessed of his reason,
can determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
We accept the position that the institution of trial by jury
is vital and fundamental to a democracy. It is incompatible
with republican government to permit the judge to determine
the fact as well as the law. Furthermore, the institution of the
jury serves to develop the spirit of citizenship. In Latin America,
for example, there were populations of diverse racial origin,
divided into castes, and separated by distrust, antipathy, and
ill feeling. To eradicate these differences arising from wealth,
social position, or traditional prerogatives, the jury system was
48. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 347-50 (3d ed. 1923). Glan-
ville Williams, however, terms "purely fanciful" the argument that the require-
ment of reducing all law to jury instructions keeps it free from subtlety and jargon.
Williams suggests abolition of the jury in favor of a three-man court, as used In
Germany. See WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT (1955).
Edward Livingston thought that the Louisiana code should precisely declare
that in all criminal prosecutions the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be
renounced. He wrote: "Were it left entirely at the option of the accused, a desire
to propitiate the favor of the judge, ignorance of his true interest, or the confusion
incident to his situation, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by
his country, and thus, by degrees, accustom the people to a spectacle they ought
never to behold; a single man determining the fact, applying the law, and dis-
posing at his will, of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen." LIVINGSTON,
REPORT MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA ON THE
PLAN OF A PENAL CODE 21 (1822).
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indispensable.4 9 By getting all these groups to participate to-
gether in a jury, there develops a common feeling of trust and
faith among all members of the body politic. In other terms,
all members of society, regardless of race or color, would ex-
perience the common bond of citizenship and mete out justice
equitably upon each other. The average citizen, by serving on
juries, becomes more public-spirited and indoctrinated in the
advantages and responsibilities of democratic government. Thus,
citizens in the real sense of the word are formed.
4. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS
In Louisiana the presence of an unqualified person on the
grand or petit jury invalidates everything which follows his
selection. At the trial, for example, the defendant can show that
a grand juror was disqualified in order to invalidate the indict-
ment. Since the concurrence of only nine of twelve jurors is
required for an indictment in Louisiana, it might be asked why
an indictment should be quashed if only one member of the
grand jury is disqualified. Ten or eleven members may have
concurred in the indictment. Although the disqualified juror is
the tenth, eleventh, or twelfth member, thereby leaving the re-
quired concurrence of nine, the bill was presented when an un-
authorized person sat with the grand jury. A disqualified juror
is considered to be a stranger in the jury room who could have
influenced the others.50
In federal criminal procedure twelve jurors of the grand jury,
which consists of not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-
three members, must concur in order to find a true bill. In fed-
eral procedure a showing that one or more members of the grand
jury were not legally qualified is not ground for the dismissal of
the indictment if it appears from the record that the finding of
the indictment was concurred in by twelve or more members,
after deducting the number not legally qualified.51 It is assumed
49. See RODRIGUEZ, THE LIVINGSTON CODES IN THE GUATEMALAN CRISIS OF
1837-1838, 13 (Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1955).
50. The presence in the grand jury room of unauthorized persons while the
jury is investigating a case invalidates an indictment. See State v. Bower, 191
Iowa 713, 183 N.W. 322 (1921). However, it can perhaps be argued that a dis-
qualified juror is not a "mere stranger" in the grand jury room.
As to the conduct of grand jurors, see In re Summerhayes, 70 Fed. 769 (1895)
In re Ellis, 8 Fed. Cas. 548 (1821) ; Pennsylvania v. Keffer, Add. 290 (Pa. 1795)
(a grand juror was intoxicated).
51. See FED. R. CRm. P. 6(b) (2). Unanimity is required in the federal petit
jury verdict. Id. 31(a).
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that the disqualified juror voted in favor of the bill but not that
he influenced others in their vote. The federal procedure was
adopted so as to circumvent attacks upon the jury, but it has not
been adopted in Louisiana. In Louisiana one disqualified juror
upsets the trial.
Article 172 sets forth the qualifications which an individual
must have in order to serve as a grand or petit juror in any
criminal proceeding. They are known as the "general qualifica-
tions" of a grand or petit juror because they do not refer to an
individual's qualifications to take part in a particular case, but
rather to his qualifications to take part in any criminal case,
irrespective of the crime or the criminal. A special qualification
can disqualify a petit juror, although he is generally qualified,
from serving in the particular case being tried.
The following is a cursory discussion of the general qualifica-
tions required by Article 172 for a grand or petit juror.
Age
A juror cannot be less than twenty-one years of age, even
though he be emancipated.5 2 There is no maximum age limit, but
if over sixty-five years of age, he may be excused from jury
service. 53 This is a personal exemption, however, and not a dis-
qualification.
Citizenship and Residence
Article 172 requires a juror to be a citizen of the state and,
in addition, a bona fide resident of the parish where the court
is to be held. Such residence must have been for one year next
preceding the service. Anyone who is a citizen of the United
States, by birth or naturalization, is also a citizen of the state
wherein he resides.54 State citizenship flows from residency in
the state. Thus, a citizen of the United States who comes to
Louisiana from another state and intends to reside permanently
in Louisiana immediately becomes a citizen of this state. After
he has satisfied the second requirement of residence for one
year, he would be eligible for jury service in that parish. A
temporary resident, however, is not competent to serve as a
juror, but if a person in fact resides in Louisiana, a temporary
52. LA. R.S, 15:172 (1950).
53. Id. 15:174(4).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Gassies v. Ballon, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 761 (1832)
State v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 16 So.2d 65 (1943).
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absence from the parish, as on a business or vacation trip, will
not alter the fact of residence.
A person need not qualify as a voter to be competent as a
juror.55 Moreover, the constitutional provision that no one is
eligible to hold any "office" unless he is an elector 56 does not
apply to jury service. 57 It is only necessary that the potential
juror intend to establish his domicile in Louisiana, and in addi-
tion reside in the parish for one year, in order to be qualified in
point of citizenship and residence.
Educational Requirements
Article 172 requires that the juror be able to read and write
the English language. The law does not require a finished
scholar, but does contemplate that his knowledge of reading and
writing shall be such as to enable him to serve competently as
a juror.58 It is quite possible, however, for a person, even with-
out a physical infirmity, to meet the two requirements of reading
and writing without being able to speak or understand the lan-
guage, which are even more important for jury service.
A jury selected by the degree of intelligence as revealed by a
questionnaire would apparently be invalid under the constitu-
tional provision providing for trial by jury.59 The jury should
not be made the representative of the most intelligent or most
successful nor of the least intelligent or least successful. The
jury is a democratic institution, representative of all qualified
classes of people. However, since the states may abolish trial by
jury, without violating the Federal Constitution, it may follow
that the states may by any qualification, not arbitrary, abolish
the cross-sectional element as well." As an institution the spe-
cial jury, in which the jurors are selected with a view to obtain-
55. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. By constitutional amendment in 1956, the resi-
dence requirement in the state for voting was reduced from two years to one year.
56. Id. art. VIII, § 13.
57. State v. James, 165 La. 822, 116 So. 199 (1928).
58. The trial judge is without right to curtail unduly counsel's examination of
the prospective jurors. See State v. Brazile, 229 La. 600, 86 So.2d 208 (1956). In
State v. McClendon, 118 La. 792, 43 So. 417 (1907), it appeared that the juror
was once able to read but had lost his capacity. Query: What about a man who is
well educated but paralyzed in both arms? In the McClendon case, in which the
illiterate juror was the only disqualified member of the grand jury, the indictment
was declared invalid.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. CONST. art. I § 9.
60. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (New York's "Blue Ribbon"
jury held constitutional) ; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann. 190 (1860).
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ing those with expert qualifications in a given field, has been
held to conform to procedural due process.61
Article 172 requires that a juror not be under interdiction.
This refers to formal interdiction under the Civil Code, but a
person who is mentally deranged and who might not be inter-
dicted because he may not have sufficient property to warrant
interdiction, would certainly be disqualified.
Charge or Conviction of Crime
Article 172 disqualifies from jury service a person who is
charged with any offense or who has been convicted at any time
of any felony. The rule may have had its basis in the Roman law
theory of capitis diminutio which operated to deprive a convicted
person of his civil, public, and political rights. The disqualifica-
tion may also stem from the view that a person is psychologically
affected by a charge or conviction of crime to such an extent that
he cannot make a fair juror.
Charged with an offense. In the case of State v. Calhoun,62
which occurred prior to the Code of 1928, a juror had been
charged with a violation of a municipal sanitary ordinance. The
statute then in effect disqualified a juror who was "charged with
any crime or offense," which is similar to Article 172 of the Code.
The court held that a charge of a misdemeanor does not render
a person ineligible, since the statute setting forth the qualifica-
tions for a juror related only to crimes cognizable to a grand
jury and that a city ordinance was not so cognizable. 3 It is to be
noted, however, that under Article 2 of the Code of 1928, subse-
quently adopted, all prosecutions are cognizable to the grand
jury. Moreover, even prior to the Code of 1928, the court in State
v. ButlerG4 threw doubt on the earlier jurisprudence when it dis-
qualified a juror who was under indictment in federal court for
a misdemeanor. The court in State v. Smith" in 1934 held that
it was not error to excuse a juror who was under charges of a
misdemeanor. This, however, is not a square holding that it is
error to retain such a juror. The rule is probably that disquali-
fication for jury service results from a pending charge for any
offense, either a felony or a misdemeanor, including a charge by
the federal government and probably one by another state.
61. See Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943) ; Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172 (1899).
62. 117 La. 82, 41 So. 360 (1906).
63. Accord: State v. Bush, 117 La. 463, 41 So. 793 (1906).
64. 149 La. 1036, 90 So. 395 (1922).
65. 179 La. 614, 154 So. 625 (1934).
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In State v. Gunter0 6 one of the jurors, some thirty-one years
before, had been charged with a felony. His conviction had been
set aside, but the case had never been retried. Instead it had been
placed on the "dead docket." The court held that since the charge
had not been dismissed when he served as a juror, he was dis-
qualified from jury service since he was still under a charge. A
charge is still pending until nolle prosequied by the district attor-
ney or ordered dismissed by the court.
Conviction of a felony. The past record of an individual in
determining his qualification as a juror is almost as important
as his present status before the law. As we have seen, an in-
dividual, to qualify as a juror, must not be presently under a
charge of a felony or a misdemeanor. The individual must also
never have been convicted of a felony."7 Conviction of a misde-
meanor, however, will not disqualify.68 Why should there be a
distinction, it should be asked, between a past conviction for a
felony or a present charge of a misdemeanor and a past convic-
tion for a misdemeanor? Perhaps the basis for the distinction
is that memory of a conviction for a felony and the vivid pros-
pect of a conviction under a pending charge of a felony or mis-
demeanor will influence the decision of an individual, whereas
a past conviction for a misdemeanor probably will not.
Physical Infirmity
Article 172 provides that the district judge may decide upon
the competency of jurors in particular cases where from physical
infirmity the person may be, in the opinion of the judge, in-
competent to sit upon the trial. A juror cannot perform his
duties properly if he cannot see, hear, or speak.
Relationship
Article 172 states that "relationship, or other causes" will
disqualify a person from jury service. The common law had the
rule that relationship to the ninth degree would disqualify a
juror; the degree of relationship in Louisiana has not been fixed,
but it does not extend as far as the early common law rule.
66. 188 La. 314, 177 So. 60 (1939).
67. A pardon wipes out a conviction and hence removes the disqualification.
68. State v. Stephens, 191 La. 111, 184 So. 559 (1938). Felonies are those
offenses where death or imprisonment at bard labor can be imposed; misdemeanors
are all other offenses.
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Article 172 does not specify the degree of disqualifying rela-
tionship. Relationship between a juror and the defendant, or to
the victim, would certainly be included in the prohibition. Rela-
tionship of a juror to counsel of either side would probably not
be permitted because an advocate has an interest in the result
of the case. The juror's relationship to the judge may be permis-
sible as he is only an arbiter in the case. The relationship be-
tween witnesses and the juror may fall within the ban of a chal-
lenge for cause. The exact prohibited relationship and degrees
were perhaps purposely omitted from Article 172 so as to take
care of the various situations which may arise by leaving the
matter in the discretion of the judge.
The prohibited relationship is more than a blood relationship.
The phrase in Article 172 of "relationship, or other causes" is
sufficiently broad to disqualify a close friend or foe of a juror.
The question, in view of the constitutional guarantee of atrial by
an impartial jury,6 should always be: "Can the juror be fair
and impartial to both the defendant and the state ?"
In Dennis v. United States,70 trial counsel for the defendant,
who was General Secretary of the Communist Party in the
United States, inquired during voir dire examination as to the
employment of each prospective juror, and challenged all gov-
ernment employees for cause. Counsel argued that because of
the "Loyalty Order"7 1 and other security investigations taking
place in Washington, government employees would be afraid to
risk the possible consequences of an acquittal and were, there-
fore, biased as a matter of law. The trial judge, denying the chal-
lenge, relied on a statute which expressly qualified government
employees for jury service.7 2 The act makes no exception for
distinctive circumstances. The United States Supreme Court
stated that the Congress has a wide discretion in defining the
impartial jury required by the Sixth Amendment and, therefore,
could provide that government employment of a juror does not
constitute implied bias when the government is a party to the
action. Since actual bias is still cause for challenge, the court
held that the impartial jury required by the Constitution is pre-
served. The theory is that no such relation exists between gov-
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LA. COST. art. I, § 9.
70. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
71. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
72. 49 STAT. 682 (1935) : "All other persons, otherwise qualified according to
law whether employed in the service of the government of the United States or
of the District of Columbia ... shall be qualified to serve as jurors."
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ernment prosecution and government employment as would
create any special interest on the part of the employee jurors.
However, the court earlier indicated that special circumstances
might create an exception which would attribute bias to the em-
ployees as a class.78 The Dennis case, involving the trial of a
Communist during a period of national hysteria, throws doubt on
whether bias can ever be implied, no matter what the special
circumstances of the case. To insist, as does the majority, that
trial of a Republican for contempt is no different in its effect
upon those close to the government than trial of a Communist
is to insist on the equality of unequals. Similarly, an action
under the Narcotics Act could not be fairly compared with an
action for contempt of the Un-American Activities Committee.7 4
As Justice Frankfurter stated in the dissent, "It was a wise man
who said that there is no greater inequality than the equal treat-
ment of unequals."
In summary, a grand or petit juror, to be qualified, must be
a citizen of the state, a bona fide resident for one year next pre-
ceding the service, in the parish where the court is to be held,
not less than twenty-one years of age, able to read and write the
English language, not under interdiction, not under charges of
any offense, not convicted at any time of any felony, no physical
infirmities, and no relationship, or other causes. Article 172 also
has an omnibus clause: "In addition to the foregoing qualifica-
tions, jurors shall be persons of well known good character and
standing in the community."
Exemption from Jury Service
Article 174 allows certain exemptions from jury service, such
as members of the legislature, the high executive officers of the
state and their employees, members of the judiciary and the bar,
physicians and surgeons, school teachers, members of the fire
department, persons over sixty-five years of age or physically
incapacitated persons, telegraph and telephone operators, rail-
road station agents, and chief engineers of electric and water
works systems. These persons are not disqualified, but may
claim exemption from jury service. The exemptions are personal
73. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) ; Frazier v. United States,
335 U.S. 497 (1948).
74. The mere fact that a grand juror had filed an affidavit against the de-
fendant does not disqualify him to sit on the grand jury which subsequently indicts
the defendant. See State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923). This is based
on the theory that grand jurors are supposed to report to the grand jury all of-
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and if the person himself does not exercise the exemption, he
may legally serve on the jury.
Time for Urging Objections
An attack upon the qualification of a particular grand or
petit juror must be made by a motion to quash filed in limine.75
If not, the objection is waived. However, a disqualification of a
juror can be urged for the first time even after verdict if it is
shown that the disqualification was not known until that time.76
In State v. Futch77 defense counsel's objection, a motion for a
new trial based on an alleged newly-discovered fact that a petit
juror was unable to read and write, was held to come too late,
on the ground that the disqualification of a juror for such a cause
must be urged before the swearing in of the juror. It is only
when the juror has answered falsely on voir dire examination as
to the particular qualification that the matter can be subsequent-
ly urged as a basis for setting aside the verdict.7 Defense coun-
sel, relying upon the deputy clerk's usual procedure of testing
all prospective jurors as to their qualifications when he swore
them in for the voir dire examination, had not examined the
juror as to his literacy. The Supreme Court held that the clerk
of court's procedure does not relieve counsel of ascertaining by a
voir dire examination the qualifications of those tendered for
jury service, and the failure of counsel to interrogate each juror
concerning his qualifications constitutes a waiver of such dis-
qualifications. 79 Counsel himself must interrogate the juror con-
cerning his qualifications.
An attack on the regularity of the drawing or selecting of the
jury, which is to be distinguished from an attack on the quali-
fenses with which they are familiar, and, secondly, grand juries can indict with no
evidence at all, simply calling upon their own knowledge of facts. Bias as a matter
of law is not implied.
75. LA. R.S. 15:355 (1950).
76. State v. Chevis, 48 La. Ann. 575, 19 So. 557 (1896) ; State v. Giffin, 38
La. Ann. 502 (1886). In a personal injury case, Church v. Capital Freight Lines,
296 P.2d 563 (Cal. App. 1956), eleven days after the verdict, the wife of one of the
jurors petitioned to have him declared mentally ill and such declaration was
made two days later. The plaintiffs claimed that the mental incompetency of the
juror deprived them of their right to a trial before a jury of twelve competent
persons. The court agreed that such a condition would entitle the plaintiffs to a
new trial but on the merits found that the evidence supported the trial judge's
determination that the juror had been qualified to serve at the trial.
77. 216 La. 857, 44 So.2d 892 (1950). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1949-1950 Term - Criminal Law and Procedure, 1 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 244 (1951).
78. State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
79. See State v. Bryan, 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932).
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fication of any particular juror, must be made within three judi-
cial days from the end of the term of the jury, or before the trial
if the trial begins before the expiration of the term plus three
days. 80 Article 253, which allows any motion to quash to be made
up to the time of trial, has been construed to apply only to de-
fects in the indictment itself, and not to the manner of selecting
or drawing the jury since a specific codal article covers the lat-
ter subject.8'
A jury is presumed to be legally constituted and to be com-
posed of competent and qualified jurors. Hence, anyone urging
the contrary has the burden of overcoming the presumption. 82
Moreover, a minor irregularity without fraud in the manner of
selecting the jury panel will not operate to disqualify the entire
venire, unless it would cause irreparable injury. 83 Generally
speaking an irregularity in the drawing of a jury panel will not
be sufficient reason to set aside the venire.
5. METHODS OF SECURING JURIES
Technical Procedure
The manner of selecting jurors in the country parishes and
80. LA. R.S. 15:202 (1950). See State v. Saba, 191 La. 1009, 187 So. 7 (1939).
Article 202 provides that the objection must be urged "before the expiration of the
third judicial day of the term for which said jury shall have been drawn, or before
entering the trial of the case if it be begun sooner." A literal application of the
article would in many situations render the filing of an objection impossible. See
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term -Criminal
Law and Procedure, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 334, 345 (1956) ; Comment, 15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 749 (1955). The court however has construed the words
"before the expiration of the third judicial day of the term" to mean "before the
expiration of the third judicial day after the term." See State v. Wilson, 204 La.
24, 14 So.2d 873 (1843) ; State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954). With-
out such an interpretation, an accused who had not committed a crime, or had not
been indicted, until after the third day of the term, would be precluded from
objecting. See State v. Vance, 31 La. Ann. 398 (1879). Article 202, as interpreted
in the Wilson case, is applicable to objections to petit jury venires as well as to
grand jury venires. State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552, 76 So.2d 727 (1954). As a
result, the defendant has a right to file objections to the petit jury venires as well
as to grand jury venires. State v. Chianelli, 226 La. 552, 76 So.2d 727 (1954). As
a result, the defendant has a right to file objections to the petit jury venire at any
time before the trial, because the trial is never held "after the end of" the jury
term. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-
Criminal Law and Procedure, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 334, 347 (1956).
81. LA. RS. 15:201 (1950). See Comment, 18 TUL. L. REv. 462 (1944).
82. State v. White, 193 La. 775, 192 So. 345 (1939).
83. LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950) provides that no venire shall be set aside because
of any defect or irregularity in the manner of selecting the jury, or in the pro-
ceedings of the jury commission, "unless some fraud had been practiced or some
great wrong committed that would work irreparable injury." See State v. Knight,
227 La. 739, 80 So.2d 391 (1955). Thus, it would not be a fatal defect if less
than three hundred names in the country parishes or seven hundred and fifty
names in Orleans Parish appear on the general venire list. See note 14 supra and
note 88 infra. The irregularity must constitute a fraud or great wrong.
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in Orleans Parish differs to such a degree that each will be con-
sidered separately.8 4
Country Parishes
The local district judge in the country parishes selects five
commissioners who, together with the clerk of court, compose
the jury commission. The five commissioners receive no salary
and are removable at the pleasure of the district judge.8 5 Three
members of the five-member commission, together with the clerk
of court, form a sufficient quorum to perform the duties of the
jury commission, provided the other members are notified of the
meeting. 6
Upon the written order of the district judge to draw a jury
panel,8 7 the commissioners meet at the office of the clerk of the
district court and in the presence of at least two witnesses select
the names of three hundred persons qualified to serve as jurors.8
Prior to the selection of the three hundred persons the commis-
sion can subpoena prospective jurors for a test of their qualifi-
cations.8 9 From this list of three hundred names, known as the
general venire list, the commission selects twenty persons who
will serve from four to eight months as grand jurors. The
twenty are selected by name, and not by lot.90 Their names are
written on slips of paper and placed in an envelope and sealed
as the "List of Grand Jurors."
The names of the remaining two hundred and eighty persons,
which are written on slips of paper, are placed in a "General
Venire Box," 9' from which the commissioners draw by lot the
names of thirty persons to serve as petit jurors for the first week
of the next ensuing session of the court, and if, in the judgment
of the commission or distrct judge, a jury for a subsequent week
84. The word "country" is used to designate all parishes outside of Orleans
Parish. The jurors who attend and serve are entitled to compensation for each
day's attendance at court, and for mileage necessarily traveled in going to and re-
turning from the court house. See LA. R.S. 13:3049 (1950) ; Op. LA. ATTY. GEN.
1948-1050, p. 238.
85. LA. R.S. 15:175 (1950).
86. Id. 15:176. See State v. Milton, 188 La. 423, 177 So. 260 (1937).
87. LA. R.S. 15:177 (1950).
88. Id. 15:179. There must be no systematic exclusion of any group in the
selection of the three hundred names.
89. Id. 15:173. Article 172 sets forth the qualifications required of a juror.
90. The commissioners are supposed to choose the best twenty men. There is
here a possibility of "stacking" the grand jury and also the possibility of systematic
exclusion of a particular group.
91. Id. 15:179.
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of the session may be required, the commissioners draw in the
same manner an additional thirty names.9 2 The thirty slips first
drawn are placed in an envelope which is sealed and endorsed as
the "List of Jurors No. 1," and the thirty additional names, when
drawn, are likewise enclosed and sealed, with the endorsement
"List of Jurors No. 2." These sealed envelopes, with the one con-
taining the list of grand jurors, are placed in a "Jury Box,"
which is sealed and delivered to the custody of the clerk of court
for use at the next session of court.93
The clerk of court makes a proc6s verbal of the meeting, re-
cording all the names in the order they are drawn and showing
the week for which they are to serve. After the meeting the
clerk delivers a list of the names drawn to the sheriff, who with-
out delay serves notice on all the named persons to attend upon
the session of court and to serve for the week for which they are
drawn. The clerk also publishes the list of grand and petit jurors
in the official journal of the parish, if there be one, or in any
public newspaper of the parish. If an official journal or other
newspaper is not published in the parish, the clerk posts the lists
on the courthouse door.94 By this publication, counsel obtains
identification of the prospective jurors.
At least once in every six months the jury commission exam-
ines the original venire list in the presence of two witnesses and
strikes from the list the names of those who have served, or who
have died, or become disqualified, and supplements the original
list with enough persons to keep the number at the original three
hundred.9 5
Drawing of grand jury. Impanelment of a grand jury in-
volves swearing them in as provided by Article 204 and instruct-
ing them as to their powers and rights as provided by Article
205. The judge usually impanels the grand jury on the first day
of the term of court.96 The grand jury can be impaneled and
sworn before the beginning of the next session of court only in
districts composed of more than one parish. 7
The judge selects a foreman from the list of grand jurors.
The choice of foreman is entirely discretionary with the judge.
92. Id. 15:181.
93. Id. 15:182.
94. Id. 15:1.83. See also id. 15:332.1.
95. Id. 15:188.
96. Id. 15:184.
97. Id. 15:190.
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Out of the nineteen names remaining in the envelope, the sheriff,
under the direction of the court, draws by lot eleven more, who,
with the foreman, constitute the twelve-member grand jury.9 8
The eight remaining names in the envelope are replaced in the
jury box, to be drawn from by lot in case any vacancy shall
occur thereafter in the membership of the grand jury panel. If
the eight names of the original list are exhausted, additional
names to complete the grand jury panel are selected by the com-
mission from the remains of the original three hundred names
of the general venire list.
A grand jury is impaneled in each parish twice in each year.99
It cannot be impaneled for more than eight nor less than four
months. 100 The grand jury, or any of its members, cannot be
discharged prior to the termination of their term except for
legal cause. The discharged grand jury, or any of the discharged
members, can make application to have the discharge reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court.101
Drawing of petit jury. The thirty petit jurors, or sixty if two
lists were drawn, are summoned to appear in court on the day
the term commences. If it appears to the judge that the thirty
or sixty names will be exhausted before a jury is drawn, or if
the names are actually exhausted, the necessary number of
jurors are drawn from a "tales jury box." The jury commission,
at the order of the court, selects one hundred persons qualified
as jurors and places their names in a box known as the tales
jury box, which is sealed and delivered "to the district clerk of
the parish.' '10 2 Publication of the tales jury is not necessary, but
a copy of the list is furnished to the state and to the defense be-
fore the commencement of the trial.1°3
It is to be noted that when the regular venire is exhausted,
or apparently will be exhausted, the court uses the "tales box"
to fill the vacancies, rather than the general venire box which
is resorted to when the grand jury panel is exhausted. 10 4 The
98. Id. 15:184.
99. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 42. In Cameron Parish, however, only one grand
jury is impanelled each year.
100. LA. R.S. 15:189 (1950). See also LA. CONST. art. VII, § 42. The time
limitation on the service of the grand jury tends to prevent the jurors from be-
coming partners of the prosecutor. See STEWART, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 46 (1945).
101. LA. R.S. 15:189 (1950).
102. Id. 15:186.
103. Ibid.
104. Id. 15:184.
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justification for resort to a "tales box" is not clear since the
general venire box may contain as many as 250 names and not
less than 220 names, resulting from the original list of 300 names
minus a grand jury list of twenty names and minus one or two
petit jury lists of thirty names each. Inasmuch as a petit juror
may ordinarily serve only one week, if he does not serve during
that week, 10 5 and the commissioners draw the panels for subse-
quent weeks out of the general venire list,106 perhaps the commis-
sioners are to resort to the tales box to fill a panel only when
the general venire list is running short. However, the judge can
always order more names added to the general venire list accord-
ing to the usual procedure outlined by Article 179.107 At any rate,
when new or tales jurors are drawn, the slips of names of tales
jurors drawn who do not serve are not replaced in the "tales jury
box" but are destroyed. Rather than obtain tales jurors from
the "tales jury box," the judge, provided he has the consent of
both the district attorney and defense counsel, can summon tales-
men from among the bystanders or persons in proximity of the
courthouse, or within the parish. 0 8
Orleans Parish
The jury commissioners for Orleans Parish are chosen from
the registered voters of Orleans Parish by the Governor. 1°0 The
commissioners are not under the control of the judges of the
criminal district court, as in the country parishes. The Governor
selects five commissioners who serve at his pleasure and who
receive a salary of $4,200 per annum. 110 Three of the commis-
sioners form a quorum, and when there is no quorum, the Gov-
ernor can appoint a person with full power of a commissioner to
fill the temporary vacancy."'
The jury commissioners qualify all persons before their selec-
tion as jurors, but the judges of the district courts still have the
right to decide finally upon their competency.112 The commis-
sioners select at large, impartially, from the citizens of Orleans
Parish having the qualifications requisite to register as voters
105. Id. 15:187.
106. Id. 15:185.
107. Ibid.
108. Id. 15:186.
109. Id. 15:191.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Id. 15:192. Article 193 provides the oath which the commissioners ad-
minister to all persons appearing before them.
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the names of not less than 750 persons to serve as jurors.11
These persons need not be registered to vote, but must meet the
qualifications of a voter," 4 and, in addition, of course, must
meet the general qualifications to serve as a grand or petit juror
as established by Article 172. The list of these names is kept as
a permanent record, and the names on the list are copied on
slips which are placed in a jury wheel from which a drawing
is made. 15
Drawing of grand jury. As stated earlier, a grand jury of
twelve is impaneled in each parish twice in each year.116 The
grand jury in Orleans Parish serves a term of six months and
cannot be discharged before the end of the term except for legal
cause. 1 7 Between February 15-20 and August 15-20 of each
year, the commissioners draw from the jury wheel the names of
not less than seventy-five persons and they are submitted to the
judge whose turn it is to impanel the incoming grand jury. Each
judge of the criminal district court in Orleans Parish in rotation
selects the grand jury. The judge chooses in his discretion,
which is limited by the prohibition against the systematic ex-
clusion of a class, twelve persons from the list of seventy-five
or more names to constitute the grand jury."18 The judge who
appoints the grand jurors has control and instruction over the
grand jury during its term of six months, to the exclusion of
all other judges of the criminal district court, and the grand
jury makes its findings and returns in open court to the appoint-
ing judge." 9 All vacancies occurring in the membership of the
grand jury are filled by the impaneling judge, who either orders
the jury commission to draw not less than twelve names from
the jury wheel, from which he selects the persons necessary to
fill the vacancies, or selects from the panel of petit jurors serv-
ing in his section to fill the vacancies. 20
Drawing of petit jury. Between the 15th and 20th of each
month, the commissioners and sheriff draw from the jury wheel
113. Id. 15:194. Act 151 of 1944 reduced the number of names from 1,000 to
750. In Orleans Parish the commissioners have regular process servers to serve and
attach jurors. Id. 15:198.
114. Under LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, as amended in 1956, a person to be
qualified as a voter must be a resident of the state for one year and of the parish
for one year.
115. LA. R.S. 15:194 (1950).
116. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 42.
117. LA. R.S. 15:200 (1950).
118. Id. 15:196.
119. Ibid.
120. Id. 15:197.
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not less than 100 names, when jurors are to be summoned for
service in only two sections of the criminal district court, and not
less than fifty additional names for each section of court order-
ing a drawing for a special jury term.121 The persons whose
names are drawn constitute the petit jury venire for the next
session of court. The names are drawn by lot from the list after
which they are then individually examined and qualified.
If the regular panel of jurors for the term is exhausted, or
apparently will be exhausted, the judge orders the criminal
sheriff or deputy to draw tales jurors. The drawing of tales
jurors in Orleans Parish is different from the procedure in the
country parishes in that the names in Orleans Parish are drawn
from the regular jury wheel rather than from a special tales
box. 122 Although a regular jury panel can never be drawn unless
there are at least 750 names in the wheel, tales jurors can be
drawn when there are as few as 500 names in the wheel.'m Be-
fore ordering tales jurors drawn from the jury wheel, the court
may borrow petit jurors who are not serving in other sections
of the court. 24 Unlike the country parishes, tales jurors in Or-
leans Parish are never selected from bystanders. 125
Systematic Exclusion of Classes
The most noted objection to the makeup or membership of a
jury is that the jury was selected in such a manner as syste-
matically to exclude members of a given race, thereby, it is
claimed, depriving the accused and members of his race of due
process of law and of the equal protection of the laws, as pro-
vided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and the statute enacted by Congress in 1875, supple-
menting that amendment.126 Although a state may abolish trial
121. Id. 15:195.
122. Id. 15:199.
123. Id. 15:194.
124. Id. 15:201.
125. Id. 15:199.
126. 18 STAT. 336, 18 U.S.C. 243 (1948), making it a federal crime for an
improper selection of a state juror, provides: "No citizen possessing all other
qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for
service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State
on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being
an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of
jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not
more than $5000."
The constitutionality of the section was upheld in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
399, 347 (1879) : "The 14th Amendment was ordained" to secure equal rights to
all persons. To render its purpose effectual, Congress is vested with power "to
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by jury without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, if it
grants trial by jury, it must do so in a non-discriminatory man-
ner. The right to a trial by an impartial jury, as provided for
in the State Constitution,'1 27 prevents the exclusion of a partic-
ular class from jury service. Accordingly, Article 172 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure declares that no distinc-
tion shall be made in the selection of a grand or petit jury on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The
intentional, arbitrary, and systematic exclusion by the state of
any portion of the population from jury service, grand or petit,
on account of race, color, creed, or national origin, would be at
variance with the fundamental law. The principal problem in
each case is to determine what actually constitutes an exclusion.
As to procedural aspects, one who wishes to avail himself of
the defense of discrimination in the selection of jurors on the
grand or petit juries must raise the constitutional question in
the trial court, and if overruled must appeal to the highest state
court. The defendant must raise the constitutional question in
the state court in order to have the adverse decision reviewed by
a federal court.12  In any attack upon the selection of the jury,
the defendant has the burden of proof. 129
Race, color, or national origin. The United States Supreme
Court ruled in Pierre v. Louisiana13 0 that there is a denial of
equal protection of the laws when a state, in the selection of
jurors, discriminates against Negroes solely because of their
race or color. The Supreme Court has never said, however, that
a defendant, as a matter of right, is entitled to have the jury
composed in part of members of his race. The defendant is not
entitled, for example, to have sitting on the jury a percentage
based on the proportion of his race to the population in the com-
munity. All that is possible must be done not to discriminate,
enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. Such legislation must act, not
upon the abstract thing denominated a state, but upon the persons who are its
agents in the denial of the rights which were intended to be secured."
The person who selects the jurors for the state derives his authority from the
state, but he is bound in the discharge of that duty to obey the Federal Constitu-
tion and the laws passed in pursuance thereof.
127. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
128. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891). See notes 80, 81 supra, for the proper
time to challenge the panel. As a possible alternate procedure, a defendant who is
denied in a state court any law providing for the equal civil rights of United
States citizens may have the case removed to a federal district court. See 62 STAT.
938, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1952). See also 62 STAT. 696, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952).
129. See State v. Pierre, 198 La. 619, 3 So.2d 895 (1941) Patton v. Mis-
sissippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
130. 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
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but success or failure to select a member of the defendant's race
is immaterial if the system of selection is fair. The only right
of the accused is that there be no "systematic exclusion" in the
selection of jurors. 181
The systematic exclusion of a race from the grand or petit
jury is sufficient reason to quash an indictment. 3 2 Inquiry is
invited as to whether a verdict of a jury should be reversed on
the ground of systematic exclusion of a class when the accused
is not a member of that class. If it is the system itself of select-
ing juries which can be attacked, regardless of the actual fair-
ness of the trial, a defendant who is a member of the white race
would be able to object to the systematic exclusion of Negroes
from jury service. Under this theory, irreparable injury to the
defendant would not be an essential for a reversal of a convic-
tion. Similarly, under the principle that race or class is not to be
a factor in the selection of jury panels, any attempt at propor-
tional representation or "systematic inclusion" of a race or class
on jury panels according to population would be as invalid as
total exclusion.13 3 On the other hand, if the fairness of the jury,
rather than the system of exclusion in selecting juries, is to de-
termine the constitutionality of the procedure, 134 then the exclu-
sion of Negroes in the trial of a member of the white race, or
the exclusion of whites from the trial of a Negro, will not con-
stitute a denial of equal protection since the exclusions were
not harmful to the accused. For, if there were any discrimina-
tion, it would be in the defendant's favor. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court has held that the verdict of a jury will not be re-
versed on the ground of systematic exclusion of a class or race
unless the accused is a member of that class.
13 5
131. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). See also Hill v. Texas. 316
U.S. 400 (1942) ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) ; Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1949-1950 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
241 (1951) ; Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand Juries, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 29
(1950) ; Comment, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 817 (1951).
132. State v. Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950).
133. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187 (1946) ; Note, 51 Micir. L. REV. 925 (1953).
134. It may be said that exclusion of Negroes harms a Negro defendant by
giving him a lesser chance than has the white man for a favorable jury, on the
assumption that racial animosity exists.
135. State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1956), cert. denied, 3-50 U.S.
1007 (1956). The Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "In our review of the de-
cisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, we do not find
any case wherein the verdict of a jury was reversed on the ground of systematic
exclusion of a class or race except where the accused was a member of that class."
228 La. 724, 729, 84 So.2d 169, 171 (1956). See also Haraway v. State, 203 Ark.
912, 159 S.W.2d 733 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 648 (1942) ; Commonwealth
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The court in State v. Perkins8 6 was concerned with the sys-
tem employed by Orleans Parish for the selection of jurors by
which Negroes were placed on jury lists in just proportion to
whites as recorded on the voters' registration roll. Over the dis-
sent of Justice O'Niell, the majority of the court held that this
method of selection of jurors is permissible since a preference
given to those desirous of having a voice in government and will-
ing to assume the responsibilities of citizenship is justified.
As stated earlier, the defendant has the burden of proving
discrimination in the selection of the jury panel. A showing that
a Negro has not served on a jury for a long period of time and
that qualified Negroes are available to serve as jurors in the
locality raises a presumption of discrimination in favor of the
defendant. The presumption, unless rebutted by the state, is
sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination and a quashing
of the entire jury panel.137 In Patton v. Mississippi8 8 the fact
that no person of African descent served on a jury for over a
period of thirty years in a locality where the adult population
was thirty-five percent Negro established a presumption of sys-
tematic exclusion which could not be overcome by a showing that
a relatively small number of Negroes met the requirement that
jurors must be qualified electors. Moreover, when an occasional
Negro is placed on a jury, the court will determine if it is a sub-
terfuge to cover intended discrimination against Negroes with
a thin veneer of constitutional compliance.1 9
In Hernandez v. Texas 4 the United States Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether the rule of the Patton
case should be extended to cover nationalities as well as races.
The defendant, an American citizen of Mexican descent, stated
that no person of Mexican extraction had served on a grand jury
or petit jury for the past twenty-five years, although qualified
persons of Mexican descent resided within the locality. The de-
fendant was unable to prove actual discrimination but relied
upon a prima facie showing of discrimination to prove his alle-
v. Wright, 79 Ky. 22 (1880); State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132, 114 Atl. 553 (1921).
Cf. Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E. 2 (1937).
136. 211 La. 993, 31 So.2d 188 (1947). See also note 147 infra.
137. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) ; Hale v. Kentucky, '303
U.S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1880). See Comment, 8 LOUIsIANA LAw REVIEW 548 (1948) for
analysis of proof problems.
138. 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
139. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
140. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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gation. The state maintained that the presumption arises only
to members of different races, and that since persons of Mexican
descent are primarily members of the white race no presumption
of discrimination should be found. The United States Supreme
Court, reversing the conviction of the state court, held that the
state court erred in limiting the application of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the white and Ne-
gro races and held that the state had failed to rebut the prima
facie showing of discrimination. 1
41
Religion. Although Article 172 of the Code does not expressly
prohibit discrimination based on creed, the deliberate and syste-
matic exclusion of members of a particular religious faith would
be unconstitutional under the "systematic exclusion" test of the
Pierre v. Louisiana42 case. So too, discrimination against mem-
bers of the defendant's political party would be unconstitu-
tional.143
The Fourteenth Amendment, though adopted to prevent dis-
crimination against a particular race, is not restricted in its ap-
plication to members of that race. Its protection is available
"when the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is
further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out
that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification."'
44
Economic status. The intentional and systematic exclusion of
certain occupational classes is repugnant to the concept of trial
by jury. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,' 45 daily wage earners
such as iron craft workers, bricklayers, carpenters and machin-
ists were intentionally excluded from the jury lists on the basis
that these individuals might suffer financial hardship by serv-
ing on juries; and, as was shown at the trial, these wage earners
were usually excused by the judge from jury duty upon their
own request. Business men and their wives constituted the ma-
jority of the jury lists. The court held that, although no actual
141. Ibid.
142. See note 129 supra. In Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. App. 297, 277
S.W. 1091 (1925) the systematic exclusion of Roman Catholics from jury service
was held to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws and violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See also People v. Hampton, 4 Utah 258, 9 Pac. 508
(1886).
143. See Kentucky v. Powers, 139 Fed. 452 (E.D. Ky. 1905), rev'd on other
grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
144. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
145. 328 U.S. 217 (1956), 21 TUL. L. REV. 116 (1946).
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prejudice was shown, wage earners cannot be intentionally ex-
cluded in whole or in part from the jury panel. The essential
element is not that the selected jury be composed of a cross-
section of the community, but that the manner of selection of
the panel be non-discriminatory. One segment of the population
cannot be arbitrarily excluded from the jury list.146
In Brown v. Allen 47 the defendant, a Negro, claimed syste-
matic discrimination against Negroes serving on grand and petit
juries resulting from the use of property and poll tax lists as
sources from which to draw jury panels. The United States
Supreme Court held that the use of property and poll tax lists
as sources of jury panels does not establish unconstitutional dis-
crimination against Negroes serving on juries and does not re-
quire reversal of a conviction which is obtained under that sys-
tem. The defendant argued that, because of economic and educa-
tional discrimination in the community, the proportion of Ne-
groes who were voters and property owners would, as in this
case, be less than the percentage of Negroes in the population
and that this fact made the system of selection invalid. The ma-
jority opinion recognized this fact but held it insufficient to
invalidate the system. The court assumed that the poll and prop-
erty tax lists used as the source of jury panels were non-discrim-
inatory as to race and that the taxes were. reasonable. Indeed, a
jury selection system which has an objective basis lessens the
opportunity for discrimination than when the choice of the jury
panel depends on the personal selection and opinion of the jury
commissioners.
Sex. The systematic and intentional exclusion of men or
women from grand or petit jury panels warrants a dismissal of
146. The Thiel case was a civil action brought in a federal court under the
Federal Employers Liability Act; a fortiori the procedure would be improper in a
criminal case. The exclusion of daily wage earners from the jury panel in the
'Thiel case was held to be reversible error, not on constitutional grounds, but on
the ground of improper administration of the jury system in federal courts. The
policy is not necessarily embodied in the concept of due process and thereby ap-
plicable to the states.
The evidence was insufficient in State v. Krieger, 212 La. 527, 33 So.2d 58
(1947) to show that white manual workers were systematically excluded from
jury service. See Comment, 8 LoUIsIANA LAW REvIEw 548, 552 (1948).
See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), where New York's "Blue Ribbon"
jury based on intelligence was held constitutional. The term "blue ribbon" is at-
tached to panels selected by a process which tends to qualify jurors of high business
standing and educational experience. As to whether government employees should
be excluded from the jury panel by reason of employment, see discussion of Dennis
v. United States, note 70 supra.
147. 73 S.Ct. 397 (1953).
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the indictment. In Ballard v. United States, which involved the
prosecution of a woman for violation of a federal criminal stat-
ute, the Supreme Court said that a federal jury panel from which
women are intentionally and systematically excluded is not prop-
erly constituted.14  The systematic exclusion of women, like the
exclusion of a racial group or an economic or social class, de-
prives the jury system of the broad base which it should have.
In Louisiana a woman must file with the clerk of the district
court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury
service before she can be called for jury duty.149 The system, in
effect, abridges the right of women to serve on juries, in that it
requires them to do something that is not required of men in
order to be eligible for jury service. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, however, rejecting the argument, has held that the re-
quirement of filing a request for jury service is not discrimina-
tory against women, but is favorable to them, because it gives
to each of them the option of choosing whether she shall be sub-
ject to jury service. 150 The requirement imposed upon women of
filing a request for jury duty is reasonably permissible, as the
148. 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 290 (1947),
the defendants claimed a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by reason of the exclusion of women from the jury panels. Justice
Jackson, as organ of the court, in stating that the question of women jury service
was not a constitutional one, said: "We may insist on their inclusion on federal
juries where by state law they are eligible, but woman jury service has not so
become a part of the textual or customary law of the land that one convicted of
crime must be set free by this Court if his state has lagged behind what we per-
sonally may regard as the most desirable practice in recognizing the rights and
obligations of womanhood." See Comment, 28 B.U.L. REV. 55 (1948).
149. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41; LA. R.S. 15:172.1 (1950).
150. State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928). The court in State V.
Bray, 153 La. 103, 95 So. 417 (1923) held that the procedure in Louisiana which
permits women to sit on juries only when they have made application for jury
service does not violate the Nineteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
since that amendment is concerned with the right of women to vote. See Notes,
20 MIcr. L. REV. 669 (1922), 70 U. PA. L. REV. 30 (1921).
For nearly a half-century after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it
was universal practice in the United States to allow only men to sit on juries. The
first state to permit women jurors was Washington, and it did not do so until
1911. In 1942 only 28 states permitted women to serve on juries and they were
still disqualified in the other 20. Moreover, in 15 of the 28 states which permitted
women to serve, they might claim exemption or must expressly waive exemption
because of their sex. In some states it became a rule of policy that women need
not be included on the jury lists where courthouses do not contain appropriate
facilities for them. See People v. Parman, 14 Cal.2d 17, 92 P.2d 387 (1939) ; R.I.
Laws 1938, c. 506, § 39. Federal courts select for jury duty only those people who
qualify as jurors under the law of the state in which the federal district court is
situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1954).
It may be objected that the Louisiana requirement- that women must file
a request for jury service in order to be called - abridges the right of the accused
to have women on the jury. The answer to this objection is that the accused has
the right to reject, and not to select jurors.
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exercise of the right to serve as jurors is not burdened with any
arbitrary restriction imposed upon women because of sex or as
a class, but is solely for the purpose of avoiding compulsory
service of women upon juries, contrary perhaps to their wishes
to exercise such a privilege of citizenship. The law is in the na-
ture of a general exemption from jury service of women as a
class, requiring an individual exercise of the option to serve, and
is as legitimate as the procedure embodied in Article 174 which
allows certain persons, such as physicians, lawyers and teachers,
to claim exemption from jury service. 151 Indeed, it may be
argued that, if the nature of the exclusion of a group is not likely
to impair the fairness of the jury, the Fourteenth Amendment
would not prevent the state from excluding, rather than merely
exempting from jury service, certain classes, such as doctors,
dentists, engineers and firemen, for the good of the commu-
nity.15 2 The right of a defendant, it has often been said, is not a
right to select, but to reject, jurors.1 53
Geography. In State v. Poe'5 4 a motion to quash the venire
was urged on the ground that no members from the ward in
which the defendant lived were drawn on the jury panel, where-
as all twelve members of the panel were drawn from the ward of
the residence of the prosecutrix. The court held that the objec-
tion does not state a legal cause for quashing the venire in the ab-
sence of fraud "or some great wrong committed that would work
irreparable injury.' 55 It seems questionable whether selection
of a jury panel from a particular ward does justice to the de-
fendant's right to trial by an impartial jury.
6. SELECTION OF PETIT JURY PANEL
Tendering of Venire
Article 343 defines the distinction between the venire and
the panel. The venire is the body of persons selected to serve as
jurors during a certain designated term. It is the group chosen
from the general jury box, made up by the jury commissioners,
to appear for a particular term of court. The panel is the five
or twelve persons who are actually selected from the venire, and
impaneled and sworn to try a particular case."56 A twelve-man
151. See page 676 supra.
152. See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
153. See State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 188 So. 85, 93 (1928).
154. 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359 (1948).
155. See LA. R.S. 15:203 (1950).
156. See generally LA. R.S. 15:343-361 (1950).
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jury is impaneled in cases in which a capital penalty may be
imposed or in which hard labor must be imposed upon a convic-
tion; a five-man jury is impaneled in cases in which hard labor
can be imposed; the judge alone tries cases in which hard labor
cannot be imposed.157
Article 344 provides that the defendant has the right to have
all jurors in the regular venire tendered to him for acceptance
or rejection at the trial of his case.6 58 It would be error to submit
only a part of the venire to the defendant. However, the right
granted the defendant by Article 344 to have all jurors in the
regular venire tendered for acceptance or rejection is flanked
by Article 345 which gives the judge the right, in his discretion,
to excuse for cause jurors of the regular venire. In excusing
jurors, however, the intentional, arbitrary and systematic exclu-
sion by the judge of any portion of the population from the petit
jury panel, on account of race, color, creed or national origin,
would be at variance with the Constitution and the Code.6 9
It was contended in State v. Gould 60 that the right granted to
the judge to excuse jurors is limited to the causes of disqualifi-
cation provided by law and which were overlooked by the com-
missioners. The judge in this case had excused 37 out of 75
jurors on the venire, without any apparent reason for doing so.
Counsel complained that this wholesale excusing was wrong,
and that the law merely granted the judge the right to excuse
jurors who did not have the proper qualifications. Counsel con-
tended: "We do not believe that this clause confers upon the trial
judge the right to select a jury. It simply gives him a right to
pass on the qualifications of a juror. In other words, if the com-
missioners should assign to the court seventy-five persons for
157. See id. 15:337-342; LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 41-42. The five-man jury
only is waivable. For a discussion of waiver of jury trial, see Perkins, Proposed
Jury Changes in Criminal Cases, 16 IowA L. REv. 20, 223 (1930). See also Note,
5 FORDHAM L. REV. 504 (1936), on the waiver of the constitutional number of
jurors.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "(a) Trial by
jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant
waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of
the government. (b) Jury of less than twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any
time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the
court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12."
ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 266 provides: "In all cases except where a sen-
tence of death may be imposed trial by a jury may be waived by the defendant.
Such waiver shall be made in open court and entered of record."
158. For a discussion of the time to file objections to the drawing or selecting
of juries, see Comment, 18 TUL. L. REV. 462 (1944).
159. See LA. R.S. 15:172 (1950).
160. 155 La. 639, 99 So. 490 (1924).
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jury duty and it should occur that some of these persons, thus
assigned, were not citizens, or had been convicted of a crime
punishable by hard labor, and had not been pardoned, and this
had escaped the scrutiny of the jury commissioners, the judge
would have the right to exclude an individual of that kind." 161
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this view and held
that the trial judge may excuse jurors from service for any rea-
son that to him may be proper and satisfactory. Furthermore,
the exercise of this discretion will not be interfered with on
appeal unless it clearly appears that the right has been abused
or that the defendant has been prejudiced thereby. The defend-
ant's right is that of eliminating incompetent jurors, not of
selecting jurors of his choice. The court indicated that if the
trial judge excuses a large percentage of the venire without ap-
plication for excuse by the jurors themselves and without taking
into consideration the question of their qualifications and com-
petency, a different view might be taken. That question was not
before the court. The holding of the court is a practical one. In
many instances, because of sickness in the family, business, or
other cause, a hardship would be imposed upon a juror in re-
quiring him to serve.
Article 346 provides that the prosecution or the defense may
demand attachment for all jurors of the regular venire who are
absent. However, if enough jurors are present to make up the
panel, the attachments cannot be demanded of right. This then
is another exception to the provision of Article 344 that the de-
fendant has the right to demand that all jurors in the regular
venire be tendered for acceptance or rejection.
Upon the exhaustion of the regular venire without complet-
ing the panel, the judge, if the prosecution or the defense so
request, must order the sheriff to call the absent jurors, before
it is permissible to tender any talesman. 16 2 Tales jurors, how-
ever, may be summoned at such time as the judge may deem ex-
pedient, but they cannot be tendered until the regular venire has
been exhausted. 16 An order made by the judge in the course of
the trial, in anticipation of the exhaustion of the regular jury
panel, directing the sheriff to summon tales jurors, and hold
them to serve, if necessary, for the purpose of saving time and
161. Id. at 644, 99 So. at 491.
162. LA. R.S. 15:347 (1950).
163. Id. 15:348. The method of choosing tales jurors, however, is not left to
the judge but is fixed by law. Id. 15:186.
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avoiding delay, is not illegal, and will not invalidate an impan-
eled jury, provided the talesmen are tendered only after the
exhaustion of the regular panel.16 4 An irregularity in summon-
ing talesmen is waived when they are accepted and sworn with-
out objection.16 5
Examination of Prospective Jurors
The examination of a juror to test his qualifications for jury
service is called the voir dire examination, literally, to see and to
speak to the juror. The purpose of the voir dire examination is
to secure fair and qualified persons to try the issue between the
state and the accused.
Article 349 states that the examination is to be conducted in
a manner as now provided by existing laws. The statutory law
on the subject, however, is brief.
General and special causes for challenge. Causes for chal-
lenge are general or special: general, when the jurors lack some
qualification required by Article 172 to serve in any case; spe-
cial, when the juror, though generally qualified, is disqualified
from serving in the particular case on trial, by reason of some
defect prescribed by Article 351 or 352.166
(i) General causes for challenge. As soon as court is con-
vened, the judge, according to custom, announces publicly from
the bench the general qualifications prescribed for jury service,
and asks that, if any one drawn for jury duty lacks any of the
qualifications, he should come forward and make known his dis-
qualifications. Then, the judge turns the jurors over to the
prosecuting and defense attorneys.
164 State v. Moncia, 39 La. Ann. 868, 2 So. 814 (1887).
165. State v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 So. 10 (1901).
166. LA. R.S. 15:350 (1950). The comment of the court in People v. Cosmo,
205 N.Y. 91, 96, 98 N.E. 408, 409 (1912) is interesting: "In the feudal days they
[the jury] were required to be freemen, and from this circumstance it may be
surmised that some, if not all, were owners of property. With the development of
civilization and the gradual establishment of property rights there came a period
when the ownership of property was probably regarded as something of an index
to the intelligence, character and standing of men in their communities, and as a
convenient basis for the arbitrary fixing of a class from which the ultimate selec-
tion of jurors was to be made. In England this qualification seems to have been
at first confined to such capital cases as treason, misprision of treason and murder
and we know that later it was extended by statute so that when the common law
took root in American soil we engrafted upon the jury system the property quali-
fication which to some extent, and in one form or another, has survived to this
day."
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Article 172 provides that the general qualifications required
for service as a petit juror, as for a grand juror, are: That he be
a citizen of this state, not less than twenty-one years of age, a
bona fide resident of the parish in and for which the court is
held for one year next preceding such service, able to read and
write the English language, not under interdiction or charged
with any offense, or convicted at any time of any felony, pro-
vided that there shall be no distinction made on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude; and provided further,
that the district judge shall have discretion to decide upon the
competency of jurors in particular cases where from physical
infirmity or from relationship, or other causes, the person may
be, in the opinion of the judge, incompetent to sit upon the trial
of any particular case. In addition to the foregoing qualifica-
tions, Article 172 provides that jurors shall be persons of well
known good character and standing in the community.
In State v. Bryan167 a bill was reserved to the overruling of a
motion to discharge the jury on the ground that one of the
jurors could not read or write the English language. Counsel did
not ask the juror whether he could read and write on his voir
dire examination, but assumed that all jurors were qualified.
The disqualification was discovered on the fifth day of trial.
A considerable part of the evidence that went to the jury was
documentary evidence. The Supreme Court held that the judge's
statement on the opening day of the criminal term of the re-
quired qualifications of jurors and his requested avowal of dis-
qualifications does not dispense with counsel's ascertainment of
the juror's qualifications on the voir dire examination. The
Supreme Court ruled that the bill of exception was not well
founded because of the failure to ask the juror about the quali-
fication before swearing in of the jury (or before the taking of
evidence).
Proper procedure, consequently, is to examine each juror
with great particularity. A standard list of questions should be
prepared. Then, if the juror tells an untruth on his voir dire,
his incompetency can later be set up for having answered
falsely on his examination. 168
167. 175 La. 422, 143 So. 362 (1932).
168. The trial lawyer would probably benefit at nominal expense by securing a
court reporter to make a record of the examination so that in the eventuality of
prejudicial misconduct by the opponent during examination or upon learning even
after verdict that a juror untruthfully-answered-an inquiry Which counsel relied
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(ii) Special causes for challenge. Articles 351 and 352 list
the special or particular causes for challenge.
Article 351 deals fundamentally with challenges for partiality.
The article provides three special causes for challenging a juror,
either by the defendant or by the state: (1) fixed opinion, (2)
relationship of the juror to persons involved, and (3) service
on grand jury or former petit jury in connection with the case. 169
A discussion of each of these special causes for challenge follows.
(1) Fixed opinion. The first of the special causes provided
in Article 351 for which a prospective juror may be challenged
is "that he is not impartial, the cause of his bias being im-
material; but an opinion as to guilt or innocence of the accused,
which is not fixed, or has not been deliberately formed, or that
would yield to evidence, or that could be changed, does not dis-
qualify the juror."
The cause of partiality is immaterial. A juror is disqualified
even though he says he is biased for some nonsensical reason.
His disqualification for partiality can arise from race prejudice,
religious prejudice, or simply because he is hostile or friendly
to the defendant. In all these cases of partiality the juror must
be excused.170
It is to be noted that the state, as well as the accused, can
challenge a juror for partiality: A juror who is friendly towards
the defendant is disqualified from jury service, just as he would
be if he were hostile to the defendant. The state, as well as the
defendant, is entitled to a fair trial.
on in accepting him, the trial attorney would be prepared. See APPLEMAN, SUC-
CESSFUL JURY TRIALS 119 (1952).
Query: Is the testimony of the other jurors as to what a juror said during
the deliberations in the jury room admissible to show that he was biased and preju-
diced at the time of his voir dire examination? See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1 (1933), 17 MARQ. L. REV. 300 (it should be observed that the court is guilty of
circular reasoning). See LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950).
169. Article 351 lists these special causes for challenging a juror: (1) That
he is not impartial, the cause of his bias being immaterial; but an opinion as to
guilt or innocence of the accused, which is not fixed, or has not been deliberately
formed, or that would yield to evidence, or that could be changed, does not dis-
qualify the juror; (2) that the relations, whether by blood, marriage, employment,
friendship or enmity, between the juror and the accused, or between the juror
and the person injured, are such that it must be reasonably believed that they
would influence the juror in coming to a verdict; (3) that the juror served on
the grand jury which found the indictment, or on a petit jury which once tried
the defendant for the same offense, or on the coroner's jury that investigated the
homicide charged against the accused.
170. State v. Guin, 212 La. 475, 32 So.2d 895 (1947). See Stout, The Exami-
nation of Prospective Jurors in Capital Cases, 29 TEx. L. REv. 34 (1950).
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In our present-day compressed society the prospective juror
is very likely to have heard about the case prior to his selection
on the panel. The prospective juror, particularly if he is on the
panel for a case of public interest, has been subjected to the
bombardment of the press, radio, and acquaintances. Scarcely
anyone can be found among those fitted for jury service who
has not read or heard about the case, and who has not some im-
pression or some opinion in respect to its merits. He has his
prejudices which he may or may not acknowledge. He has ex-
perienced the climate of opinion of his community.
It is clear, therefore, that some concession is necessary to
this modern situation. Article 351 provides that an opinion as
to guilt or innocence of the accused, which "is not fixed, or has
not been deliberately formed, or that would yield to evidence,
or that could be changed, does not disqualify the juror." Fur-
thermore, a prospective juror's competence or incompetence is
not determined from isolated answers given during the course
of his examination. It is judged from the entire examination.' 7'
In State v. Birbiglia,172 a murder case which attracted much
publicity, each of the proposed jurors admitted that he had
formed an opinion from the newspaper accounts of the homicide.
Each of them said that his opinion was so fixed that it would
require strong evidence to remove, but each of them also said
that he could and would, if taken on the jury, put aside his
opinion, and, presuming the defendant to be innocent, be gov-
erned entirely by the evidence in the case, and that he would not
convict unless the state proved the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that the jurors were
qualified.
It is to be noted that the jurors were accepted even though
they said that their opinion was so fixed that strong evidence
would be required to overcome it. Although each juror admitted
that he would be governed by the evidence in the case, who as a
matter of fact has the burden of proof? And what about the
presumption of innocence? The case is extreme, yet it does show
the difficulty of obtaining an impartial jury in modern times. 173
171. See State v. Henry, 200 La. 875, 9 So.2d 215 (1942).
172. 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533 (1920).
173. The defendants, Felix Birbiglia and Charles Zalenka, were actually hanged
(on the same day that prizefighter Jack Dempsey knocked out Carpentier) for a
most brutal murder of a young woman.
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In State v. Thornhill7 4 a juror admitted on his voir dire
that he had a fixed opinion, but added that it would probably
yield to the evidence. The trial judge then excused the juror
for the reason that he had a fixed opinion. The Supreme Court
held that the ruling was correct, as the juror did not state
that his opinion would yield to the evidence in the case, or
that it could be changed, but that it "would probably yield" to
the evidence. The court held that only an opinion of innocence
or guilt which can definitely be changed by the evidence will not
disqualify a juror.
Again, in State v. Henry,175 involving a murder which at-
tracted great attention, the juror on his voir dire admitted that
he had formed an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused, but said that he "thought" that it would yield to the
evidence. The court stated: "The fact that a man has formed
an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused does not
necessarily disqualify him from serving as a juror. If he states
on his voir dire examination that his opinion would readily yield
to the testimony adduced, that he could and would lay aside that
opinion, he is competent. But where, as in the instant case, the
juror makes it plain he has an opinion and that he is not sure
that he can lay it aside, he is not competent."' 176
On the retrial of the case,1 77 two of the prospective jurors,
who were highly educated men, admitted that they entertained
opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, based on
information they received by reading the newspaper accounts
of the previous trial. Both of these men declared that their
preconceived opinion would readily yield to the evidence ad-
duced during the trial. The court again stated that a prospec-
tive juror who has formed an opinion is competent if, having
no prejudice against the accused, he can lay aside that opinion.
Probably the best statement of the rule is in State v. Hamil-
ton: "The jurisprudence of this state has consecrated the rule
that proffered jurors are not incompetent or disqualified from
serving as jurors in a criminal case because of impressions or
opinions formed from reading of newspaper reports and from
hearing the case discussed, where such impressions and opinions
are not definitely fixed, but will readily yield to the evidence
174. 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937).
175. 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941).
176. Id. at 1019, 3 So.2d at 111.
177. State v. Henry, 200 La. 875, 9 So.2d 215 (1942).
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adduced on the trial of the case, and where such jurors feel, and
so testify to the satisfaction of the trial judge, that their minds
are open and in such condition as that they can and will decide
the case solely on the evidence produced on the trial of the
case."
7 8
The statement is in effect a mere elaboration of Article
351 (1), which was subsequently enacted, that a juror is not dis-
qualified by an opinion as to guilt or innocence "which is not
fixed, or has not been deliberately formed, or that would yield
to evidence, or that could be changed." Considerable discretion
is vested in the trial judge in determining whether previous
knowledge of the case will disqualify a juror, and whether the
juror's positive testimony that he will decide the case entirely
upon the evidence presented at the trial is sufficient to bring
him within the proviso of Article 351.
The standard observed in Lord Mansfield's day and time,
that the mind of a juror should be "white as paper," is imprac-
tical under modern conditions, and is no longer accepted as cor-
rect. The rule now generally observed, although the courts of
several of the states have gone much further, is the one an-
nounced by Chief Justice Marshall on the trial of Aaron Burr.
He said: "Were it possible to obtain a jury, without any pre-pos-
session whatever respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused,
it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is
perhaps impossible, and therefore will not be required. The
opinion which has been avowed by the court, is that light im-
pressions which may be fairly supposed to yield to the testi-
mony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to
a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions,
which will close the mind against the testimony that may be
offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony
and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.
Those who try the impartiality of a juror, ought to test him by
this rule."'179
This rule has long been adhered to in Louisiana. 180 In apply-
ing the rule, the question of whether a juror is disqualified by
178. 155 La. 1069, 1071, 99 So. 874 (1924).
179. See State v. George, 8 Rob. 535, 538 (La. 1844). In the early common lawjurors were selected because they were familiar with the facts in the case, and
not, as now, because of their ignorance of them.
180. See cases cited in State v. Joiner, 163 La. 609, 112 So. 503 (1927).
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reason of a preconceived opinion is always one of degree, and
the court must determine, from all the circumstances of the case
and the mental characteristics of the juror, as disclosed on his
voir dire, whether his state of mind is such and the opinion he
entertains is such as will prevent him from rendering full and
impartial justice in the case. It is important to determine
whether the juror entertains a strong opinion or merely a weak
impression.
(2) Relationship of juror to parties and others involved.
The second of the special causes provided in Article 351 for
which a juror may be challenged is "that the relations, whether
by blood, marriage, employment, friendship or enmity, between
the juror and the accused, or between the juror and the person
injured, are such that it must be reasonably believed that they
would influence the juror in coming to a verdict." The entire
community is usually enraged by the commission of a crime,
but unless the juror has a special relationship to the victim, it
is supposed that his emotions and passions have not been so
aroused as to deprive the accused of a fair trial. It is only the
existence of one of the relationships listed in Article 351(2)
which may justify the presumption that the juror is biased.
At common law a juror was subject to challenge if he was
related to a party to the action within the ninth degree, by
affinity or by consanguinity.1 " However, rather than provide
that a given degree of kinship to certain participants will dis-
qualify a juror, as is the practice of many jurisdictions, the
statute in Louisiana provides that any relationship between the
juror and the accused, or between the juror and the victim,
which would influence the juror in reaching his verdict is a
basis for a challenge for special cause.' 8 2 Personal friendship or
enmity is sufficient cause to incapacitate a juror from serving,
even without a family relationship. On the other hand, distant
relationship unaccompanied by prejudice is no cause for chal-
lenge.18 3
A practical interpretation, similar to that given the right
under Article 351 (1) to challenge for a preconceived opinion, is
181. See McGee, Melccting the Jury in Criminal Cases -- Some Common Law
Aspects, 5 ALA. L. IlEv. 213, 218 (1952).
182. LA. R.S. 15:351(2). The court in State v. Caron, 118 La. 349, 42 So.
960 (1907) pointed out that at common law family relationship to the ninth degree
was considered a good ground for challenge, but the court (lid not adopt the rule.
See Note, 25 TUL. L. REv. 402 (1951).
183. State v. Carricut, 157 La. 140, 102 So. 98 (1924).
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adopted for the right to challenge for cause because of relation-
ship, friendship, or enmity. In State v. Atwood,18 4 a murder
case, a prospective juror on his voir dire testified that he was
acquainted with both the deceased and the defendant, and that
he was acquainted also with certain members of the deceased's
family. However, he added that he was not biased or prejudiced
against the accused, and that his various acquaintances would
not influence him in his verdict in any way. Under these circum-
stances, the court held that there was no merit in a challenge
for cause.
However, a juror whose relation to the defendant or the in-
jured party is such that his partiality may be presumed is sub-
ject to challenge for cause, as, for example, a venireman who
is the uncle of the defendant, 1 5 or who is related to prosecutrix
in a trial for attempted rape.' The case of State v. Dunn,18
7
which deals with various aspects of relationship as affecting
the competency of a juror, should be considered. Here, several
jurors were challenged for a variety of reasons; and, as the
defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges in selecting the
jury, bills of exception were reserved during the impaneling of
the jury to the overruling of his challenges for cause. A juror
against whom the challenge for cause was directed was a mem-
ber of the Ku Klux Klan, of which the deceased was also a
member, and attended the funeral of the deceased in the regalia
of that organization. Two or three propective jurors were mem-
bers of the same church to which the deceased belonged, and
of which he was an officer, and attended the same Bible class
that the deceased attended. One of the veniremen made dona-
tions to a fund for the relief of the widow and children of the
deceased. The jurors who were Klansmen answered on their
voir dire that the fact that they were members of the Klan would
not influence their verdict one way or another if they were ac-
cepted as jurors; that those who were members of the same
church and Bible class, as was the deceased, answered that they
would not be influenced by that fact in reaching a verdict; and
those who made donations answered similarly.
It should be observed that, while what a juror says about his
impartiality should be given consideration, it is not binding
184. 210 La. 537, 27 So.2d 324 (1946).
185. State v. Rankins, 211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837 (1947).
186. State v. Houck, 199 La. 478, 6 So.2d 553 (1942).
187. 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56 (1926).
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upon the trial judge, whose function it is to decide the question.
The declaration of the prospective juror, that he can disregard
all personal views and feelings and give the defendant a fair
and impartial trial, must be tested like all other human testi-
mony, according to the common knowledge, experience, and ob-
servation of mankind. It is the natural impulse of all men, with
rare exceptions, when the queston is put to them, to declare that
they believe that they can disregard a preconceived opinion and
render a fair and impartial verdict upon the evidence submitted
to them. In general, they are sincere in their statement and
belief. The declaration, however, should not only proceed from
the lips of the venireman, but it should be made .in connection
with a state of facts showing that it is probably true.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not err in
refusing to sustain the challenges for cause. The proof, the
court stated, showed that the rules, regulations, or ritual of the
organizations do not call upon a member to convict a person
charged with killing another member of that organization when
the law and the evidence do not justify a conviction. Nor did the
court think that the fact that a juror has contributed to a fund,
raised by public subscription, for the relief of the widow and
children of the deceased, is a ground to challenge the juror for
cause. A contribution for the relief of the widow and children
of the deceased is made upon the supposition that the Widow and
children are in necessitous circumstances, and the contribution
cannot be considered as made for the prosecution of the case.
However, there was some evidence (denied by counsel who as-
sisted the state) that money collected had been used to hire a
lawyer to aid the prosecution. The court indicated that if a
juror had knowingly contributed to a fund for this purpose, he
would be disqualified.
Another bill was reserved to the overruling of a challenge
for cause, based on the ground that the juror's wife was a third
cousin of the widow of the deceased. The court held that there
was no error in overruling the challenge, as the connection was
only by affinity and was remote, and the juror stated on his voir
dire that he would not be influenced by the connection.1 88
It appeared on the voir dire examination of another juror
that his brother and the deceased married sisters, and the state,
188. Accord, State v. Phillips, 164 La. 597, 114 So. 171 (1927) (juror was sec-
ond cousin of deceased).
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upon that ground, challenged the juror for cause, which chal-
lenge was sustained by the trial judge. The Supreme Court held
that there was no error in sustaining the challenge, but even if
the juror were competent, the defendant has no legal ground to
complain. The court reiterated the important doctrine that "the
right of an accused in the impaneling of a jury is not to select
jurors, but is only to reject them." The right of rejection but
not of selection of jurors means that a party cannot complain
when a challenge for cause of a perfectly competent juror is
sustained. 8 9
Article 351(2) does not consider the relationship of a pros-
pective juror with counsel, or with a witness, of either side. In
State v. Thornhill'9" the trial court ruled that a juror who was
the first cousin of an attorney assisting in the prosecution was
competent. The Supreme Court stated that relationship to the
district attorney, or an associate counsel for the state, is not a
cause for which a juror may be challenged. "Besides," the court
added, "the juror answered on his voir dire that the fact of his
relationship would not influence him in arriving at a verdict."'191
Moreover, the court holds that a juror who is related to a
witness is qualified unless he is shown to be actually biased or
prejudiced. 92 In State v. Joiner'93 a prospective juror who was
friendly with the main witness for the state was disqualified,
but this was because he had formed a strong opinion on the case.
(3) Service on grand jury or former petit jury. The third
of the special causes provided in Article 351 for which a juror
may be challenged is "that the juror served on the grand jury
which found the indictment, or on a petit jury which once tried
the defendant for the same offense, or on the coroner's jury that
investigated the homicide charged against the accused." The
objection, however, is waived when the defendant, with knowl-
edge of the prior service of the venireman, accepts him without
objection. 194
189. Accord, State v. Foster, 164 La. 813, 114 So. 696 (1927) ; State v. Car-
ricut, 157 La. 140, 102 So. 98 (1924).
190. 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937).
191. Id. at 770, 178 So. at 346.
192. State v. Jones, 195 La. 611, 197 So. 249 (1949) (son of coroner, a routine
state witness, was held competent) ; State v. Holbrook, 153 La. 1025, 97 So. 17
(1923) (juror's aunt was possible witness). See also State v. Houck, 199 La.
478, 6 So.2d 553 (1942).
193. 163 La. 609, 112 So. 503 (1927).
194. See State v. Jackson, 37 La. Ann. 897 (1885). At early common law it
was permissible for members of the grand jury to be included in the petit jury.
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Even without the provision, a venireman who has had prior
connection with the case could be disqualified for having formed
a fixed opinion and for not being impartial. Article 351(3)
leaves open the qualification of a venireman who has had court-
room acquaintance with an aspect of the case. For example, in
State v. Stroud, 9 the defendant was jointly indicted with an-
other for theft, but a severance was granted on the ground that
their defenses were antagonistic. After the trial of the co-
defendant had been completed and the jury had retired to de-
liberate on their verdict, the defendant was called for trial. His
counsel objected to going to trial for the reason that the accused
could not secure a fair and impartial trial by a jury impaneled
from members of a venire who had been in the courtroom and
had heard some, if not all, of the evidence produced on the first
trial, which would be used on the trial of the defendant. The
prospective jurors testified on their voir dire examination that
they had heard a portion of the evidence and had formed an
opinion which was not fixed and would yield to the evidence ad-
duced on the trial of the defendant. The court held that the
accused was afforded a trial by an impartial jury.
Suppose two indictments are brought against a single de-
fendant and the above situation developed. Would a prospec-
tive juror, who had heard the first case, be qualified for jury
service in the second trial? The court discusses this point and
refers to State v. Frazier1 90 where exactly this happened. The
defendant here was tried for two offenses arising out of the
same transaction; he had participated in a robbery and had
later attempted to murder the person who assisted him in the
crime. Upon completion of the trial of robbery and while the
jury was deliberating on its verdict, the defendant was placed
on trial for attempted murder. Defense counsel objected to his
going to trial, contending that the accused could not secure a
fair and impartial trial from a jury impaneled from members
of a venire who had remained in the courtroom and had heard
much of the evidence against the defendant in the robbery case.
He contended that the members of the jury venire were "auto-
matically and unintentionally" prejudiced by their presence in
the courtroom during the first trial. The prospective jurors tes-
tified that the previous trial would not influence their verdict.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's ruling that the
195. 220 La. 806, 57 So.2d 691 (1952).
196. 209 La. 373, 24 So.2d 620 (1946).
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veniremen were not automatically disqualified. Considerable dis-
cretion is vested in the trial judge in determining whether a
previous acquaintance with the case will disqualify a juror.
(4) Other special causes for challenge. Article 352 also pro-
vides causes for challenge, but they are exercisable only on the
part of the prosecution and not on the part of the defense. It is
good cause for challenge on the part of the prosecution (1) that
the juror is biased against the enforcement of the statute charged
to have been violated, or is of the fixed opinion that the statute
is unconstitutional; or (2) that the juror tendered in a capital
case has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital
punishment; or (3) that the juror would not convict upon cir-
cumstantial evidence. A person who is not exempt from jury
duty by law soon learns that there are means by which he can
avoid the service, if he so desires. All he needs to say is that
he has formed a fixed opinion about the case, he is against
capital punishment, or that he will not convict upon circum-
stantial evidence.
The statute does not contemplate that the prosecutor should
question prospective jurors in capital cases as to the kind of
verdict they would favor under a given state of facts or cir-
cumstances. It is optional with the jurors to qualify their ver-
dict, and the state has no right to question them as to the char-
acter of verdict they would favor under a given state of facts.
In State v. Henry19T the district attorney, in questioning the
jurors on voir dire as to their views on capital punishment
under Article 352, asked the question in such a way that he
practically made the whole panel commit themselves to capital
punishment if he proved a given set of facts. Each of the jurors
indicated in advance what his verdict would be under a certain
state of facts. The procedure was held erroneous. The impor-
tance of the case is this: In examining a juror, under Article
352, the state may question him about his prejudices relative to
a statute, or to capital punishment, or to circumstantial evi-
dence, but he cannot ask a juror, "will you return a verdict of
capital punishment if certain facts are proved?" or "will you
convict if certain circumstances are proved?" Article 352 does
not allow the state to cause jurors to commit themselves to any
verdict. The jury's power to qualify its verdict is an unlimited
power which cannot be impaired by seeking to bind the jurors in
197. 197 La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941).
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advance. 198 The prosecutor, as well as the defense lawyer, fre-
quently tries to commit the jury in advance to its side of the
case by the use of hypothetical assumptions of how the evidence
will turn out in the case, and how in these contingencies the
jurors will act. Hypothetical questions tie down the juror, and
bind his judgment and vote in advance of the evidence and the
judge's charge, and therefore are improper and should not be
allowed.
In State v. Guin,1 99 a murder prosecution of a sixteen-year-
old boy, the district attorney questioned the prospective jurors
on voir dire to determine whether or not they would try a de-
fendant under seventeen for the crime of murder as they would
an adult. A negative answer would indicate that the juror was
antagonistic to the constitutional provision requiring a criminal
trial of a juvenile between the ages of fifteen and seventeen in
capital cases, and was incapable of rendering a fair and im-
partial verdict. Counsel for the defendant argued that the ques-
tions deprived the accused of the benefit of the juror's natural
lenient attitude toward a juvenile. The Supreme Court, in re-
jecting the contention, pointed out that the age of the accused
is not an element or a determining factor in the establishment
of the crime of murder. The jury may take into consideration
the age of an accused only after it has reached the conclusion
that he has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, in
determining whether he should be made to pay the extreme
penalty for his crime or whether it should qualify its verdict.
The questions propounded would have been improper had they
sought in any way to limit the juror's power to qualify his
verdict.
In State v. Dunn,200 a bill of exception was reserved by the
defendant to the court's ruling which sustained a challenge of a
juror for cause, made by the state, because the juror said on his
voir dire that he would not inflict the death penalty in a case
where the evidence was purely circumstantial. The defendant
198. See LA. R.S. 15:409 (1950). Counsel may ask a juror if he "could," but
not whether he "would" render a certain type of verdict. See The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the .1954-1955 Term - Criminal Law and Procedure,
16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 334, 348 (1956). As a corollary of the statutory rule
that the prosecution may challenge for cause a juror who has conscientious scruples
against the infliction of capital punishment, it has been recognized that the defense
has a proper challenge for cause where the juror has conscientious scruples against
the rendition of a qualified verdict. See State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 233, 198
So. 9.0, 915 (1940).
199. 212 La. 475, 32 So.2d 895 (1947).
200. 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56 (1926).
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objected to the challenge for cause on the ground that the state
had not declared that the case was one wherein the evidence was
purely circumstantial, and until it is so declared it had no right
to challenge for cause on that ground. During the course of the
trial it developed that the state's case consisted purely of cir-
cumstantial evidence. But, aside from that, the Supreme Court
held that even the erroneous sustaining of a challenge by the
state affords no ground for setting aside the verdict, because
the defendant has the right only to reject jurors, and not to
select them.
Peremptory challenges. A peremptory challenge is one that
excludes a juror from serving without the necessity of assigning
a reason for the challenge. It is the right to have a juror ex-
cluded without cause, and the court is bound to allow it. Al-
though a peremptory challenge can be made without giving any
reason, it may be better practice to justify its use by a reason
to avoid creating an unfavorable impression upon the jurors
retained. Article 354 provides the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed each side.20 1 Obviously, since the number of
peremptory challenges are limited, counsel should first resort to
a challenge for cause whenever possible.
In capital crimes, or crimes necessarily punishable with im-
prisonment at hard labor, the defendant and the prosecution are
each entitled to twelve peremptory challenges. In all other cases,
the defense and the state each have six peremptory challenges.
Each defendant, in a mass trial case, is entitled to the number
of peremptory challenges provided in Article 354, and the state
is given the same number of challenges "for each defendant. 20 2
Prior to the Code of 1928, the state had one-half of the num-
ber of peremptory challenges that were given to the accused.
The state had six, the defense twelve. This provision originated
in England during the time when over one hundred and sixty
crimes, from petty larceny up to murder, were punishable by
hanging. The severity of penalties for the small offenses re-
201. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides that the accused "when tried by iury
shall have the right to challenge jurors peremptorily, the number of challenges to
be fixed by law."
202. LA. R.S. 15:354 (1950) was amended by Act 365 of 1938 to read "each
defendant" instead of "the defendant." However, this was already the rule by inter-
pretation. See State v. Caron, 118 La. 348, 42 So. 960 (1907). In some jurisdic-
tions, if there is more than one defendant, they must jointly share a single de-
fendant's peremptory challenges. See STEWART, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 199, 204 (1945) ; Note, 14 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 142 (1939).
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sulted in the development of these protections for the defendant.
The court wanted to mitigate as far as possible the severity and
harshness of penalties that were inflicted upon conviction. At
present, since it is felt that there is no reason to handicap the
state in such a manner, the state is allowed the same number
of challenges as the defendant.
In the case of State v. Elmore=3 (which occurred prior to
the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1950), counsel argued
that Article 354, entitling the state to as many peremptory chal-
lenges of jurors as defendant, is substantive and not procedural
law, and is therefore unconstitutional under the ruling in State
v. Rodosta,2 4 where it was held that the Legislature could not,
by adopting the Code of Criminal Procedure in a special manner,
change the substantive law of the state because no such au-
thority was conferred by the Constitution. The court held the
section to be constitutional, as relating to a matter which is
purely procedural, since it regulates the steps by which one who
violates a criminal statute is punished, and does not declare what
acts are crimes nor prescribe the punishment for committing
them. 05
Priority of challenging jurors. There is some division among
the states on the question of priority of challenging. Generally
the prosecution is required to challenge first. Practice varies as
to whether all, or more than one, challenge must be made at a
time. The question is resolved in most states by statute.
In State v. Roberson2 6 a bill was taken to the refusal of the
trial judge to have a full panel of twelve jurors present in the
jury box in front of the accused at all times while the jurors
were being examined on their voir dire. Each juror was called
individually and examined by the state, tendered to the defend-
ant and either accepted or rejected by him. The defendant con-
tended that all twelve simultaneously should have been tendered
to him. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "[s] ince it is not
mandatory on the court to select a jury according to any pre-
scribed form, it follows that a jury may be selected in any way
that permits the accused to examine each juror touching his
203. 179 La. 1057, 155 So. 896 (1934).
204. 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931).
205. Accord, State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1938).
206. 157 La. 974, 103 So. 283 (1925).
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qualifications, and to exercise as to such juror his right to chal-
lenge for cause, or peremptorily, as the case may be.
20 7
Hence, a lot of leeway exists in the method of examination,
with one exception, to wit, Article 358. This article provides in
part that the jurors must be tendered first to the prosecution,
and, if accepted, then tendered to the defense; the article fur-
ther provides that when a juror has been accepted by both sides,
then neither side has an absolute right to challenge him peremp-
torily.
In State v. Ferguson 2°8 the district attorney examined sev-
eral jurors on their voir dire and tendered them to the defend-
ant without acceptance or rejection. After their examination,
the defendant tendered them back to the district attorney with-
out acceptance or rejection. The defendant objected to the trial
court's ruling that the district attorney has the right to cause
the defendant to accept or reject first. The Supreme Court held
that the procedure was reversible error.
The state is required to exercise its right of challenge first
because the party who has the last choice has the advantage.
The state may not want a juror but will pass him temporarily
in the hope that the defendant will challenge him peremptorily,
thus saving a challenge for the state and wasting one for the
defendant. The trial judge in his per curiam, while admitting
that he had committed error, stated that a new trial should not
be granted because the defendant had not exhausted his peremp-
tory challenges and hence was not prejudiced. The Supreme
Court, however, stated that the method of challenging jurors in
this case was a direct violation of a substantial right guaranteed
the accused under the Constitution 20 and constitutes reversible
error, even though no prejudice is shown to the defendant. 210
The tendering of a juror to the defendant's counsel, by the
district attorney, after he has examined the juror on his voir
dire, is in itself tantamount to an acceptance of the juror by the
district attorney, subject to the rights which are accorded to both
sides under Articles 358 and 359. 211
207. Id. at 986, 103 So. at 287.
208. 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937).
209. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10, guarantees the defendant a right to peremptory
challenges but leaves the number thereof to be fixed by the legislature.
210. Cf. State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 7 So.2d 221 (1941).
211. See State v. Boone, 194 La. 977, 195 So. 511 (1940). The following sys-
tems for examining veniremen are possibilities: (a) The court calls one venireman
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Time for challenge. (i) Peremptorily. Article 358 provides
that when a juror has been accepted by both sides, the court
in its absolute discretion may allow either side to peremptorily
challenge the jurors up to the time that the jury is impaneled.
The rule that the tender of a juror by the prosecution to the de-
fendant is an acceptance of that juror by the district attorney
is cut across to the extent that the judge has the discretion
under Article 358 to allow a challenge after the defendant has
accepted the juror. In State v. Thornhill,2 12 after a jury of twelve
had been selected and duly sworn, the state, over the objection
of the defense, was permitted to use one of its peremptory chal-
lenges. The defendant contended that under Article 358 the
trial judge, after a juror has been accepted by both sides, can
allow a party to peremptorily challenge jurors only up to the
time that the jury is impaneled, and not thereafter. In this case
the defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges when
the new juror was called, nor did he challenge him, and as a
consequence, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on the
ground that the defendant had suffered no injury.
at a time for examination and qualifies him generally. The state then makes its
decision, and if the prospective juror is found satisfactory, he is submitted to the
defendant for his approval. If satisfactory, the juror then goes into the box and
the next venireman is called. (b) The court calls a group to two, three, or any
number up to twelve and examines the whole group, submits them to the district
attorney, and then to the defendant, and those who remain take their seats. See
State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1955). (c) The court calls a group of
twelve veniremen and allows the district attorney to examine them. If he chal-
lenges, say five, then the court calls five more and so forth until a twelve-man
jury is acceptable to the district attorney. Then they are submitted to the defend-
ant. If the defendant excuses five, then five more veniremen are submitted to the
district attorney, and then turned over to the defendant, and so forth. Another
method is for each side to be given a list of jurors in order in which they will be
called. Each marks his challenges and then those not challenged by either side are
called and examined as to challenge for cause. This procedure would not be per-
missible in Louisiana because of Article 358, requiring a tendering of jurors first
to the prosecution, and, if accepted, then to the defense. See Adams, Hints on
Reforms in Louisiana Criminal Procedure, 2 LOYOLA L.J. 7 (1920).
In the federal courts in Louisiana the trial judge examines the prospective
jurors, and if the attorneys wish to ask any questions of the jurors, these ques-
tions are directed through the judge. In this manner the judge screens all ques-
tions to the jurors and may delete any which he feels are irrelevant, immaterial,
or embarrassing in any manner. Usually the selection of a jury panel in a fed-
eral court will take only about fifteen minutes. The federal court in Louisiana
prides itself on the high quality of jury panel which it has had in its cases. The
federal authorities try to do everything in their power to convenience a juror. If
for some reason an attorney receives a continuance, the United States Marshal
will contact each juror and inform him that he is not required to come to court
that day. Every juror who is called in the federal courts is paid seven dollars a
day, whether he sits in a jury panel that day or not. The practice is to allow a
five-year interval between jury service periods.212. 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937), cited with approval in State v. Rankins,
211 La. 791, 30 So.2d 837, 839 (1947). See also Note, 4 TEXAS L. REv. 125 (1925).
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The court stated:
"If it should appear in any case that, at the time the State
peremptorily challenged a juror, the panel was complete, and
the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges and
was compelled, because of the State's challenge, to accept an
obnoxious juror, we would not hesitate to set aside the con-
viction and sentence in such a case, as both prejudice and
injury to the defendant would be clearly shown.
"But, in the instant case, it is not stated by defendant...
that defendant's peremptory challenges had been exhausted,
and that he was forced, by the peremptory challenges allowed
the State, to accept an obnoxious juror.
"Nor does defendant pretend . . .that, by his ruling, the
trial judge allowed the State more peremptory challenges
than are allowed by law. Had he done so, it would have been
reversible error, and a new trial would have to be granted to
defendant. But the fact is that the district attorney ex-
hausted his last peremptory challenge against the juror,...
as shown by his statement: 'We have one other challenge and
want to challenge [the juror].' The record fails to disclose
that any additional peremptory challenge was allowed the
State by the trial judge in this case. '218
(ii) For cause. Article 355 provides that the incompetency
of a juror for cause can be challenged up to the time that he is
sworn in, unless the juror answered falsely on his voir dire ex-
amination as to the particular qualification afterwards com-
plained of. However, Article 359 states that a juror, although
he may have been accepted by both the prosecution and the de-
fense, may, up to the beginning of the taking of evidence, be
challenged for cause by either side, or be excused by consent of
both sides. The articles differ as to the ultimate time for a chal-
lenge for cause, as the swearing in of the jury and the taking
of evidence do not occur simultaneously. The conflict is possibly
resolved by Article 360 which provides that, after a juror has
been accepted and sworn, and it is discovered that he is incom-
petent to serve, the judge may, in the exercise of his sound dis-
cretion, at any time before evidence has gone to the jury, order
the juror to be set aside and the panel to be completed in the
ordinary course. Hence, from a combined reading of Articles
213. 188 La. 762, 778, 178 So. 343, 348 (1937).
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355, 359, and 360, counsel has an absolute right to challenge a
juror for cause before he is sworn in, but, after swearing in
and until the taking of evidence before the jury, it is within the
discretion of the trial judge to allow a challenge for cause. How-
ever, if it is discovered after the taking of evidence that a juror
falsified as to his qualifications, a mistrial will be called, unless
alternate jurors were drawn.
Alternate jurors. After the trial of a criminal case has begun,
it sometimes becomes necessary to discontinue the proceedings
and start all over again because a juror is unable to continue
for some impelling reason such as illness. It is particularly dis-
appointing to have this happen after the case has been in prog-
ress for many days. The longer the trial the greater is the pos-
sibility of such an occurrence. In some jurisdictions the defend-
ant can avoid the necessity of a fresh start by waiving his right
to a full panel, but this procedure is not satisfactory because it
places the control of the trial in his hands. As a result, the trend
in many states is to authorize the selection of alternate jurors
for cases likely to be protracted.
The statute in Louisiana provides that whenever, in the opin-
ion of a judge of a district court about to try a defendant
against whom an indictment or information has been filed, the
trial is likely to be a protracted one, the court may cause an
entry to that effect to be made in the minutes of the court,
and thereupon, immediately after the jury is impaneled and
sworn, the court may direct the selection of one or two alternate
jurors.214 The provision that the trial court may direct selection
of one or two additonal jurors, if he thinks that the trial may
be protracted, is however not mandatory. 21
Alternate jurors are drawn from the same source, and in
the same manner and have the same qualifications as the jurors
already sworn, and are subject to the same examination and
challenges. Each defendant is entitled to one peremptory chal-
lenge to each of the alternate jurors and the prosecution is en-
titled to one challenge to each of the alternate jurors for each
defendant.
214. LA. R.S. 15:362 (1950), originally Act 6 of 1940, was placed in the Code
of Criminal Procedure as Article 359.1.
215. State v. Roberson, 225 La. 74, 72 So.2d 265 (1954). Rule 24(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may direct that not
more than four jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled to
sit as alternate jurors.
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The alternate jurors sit with the regular jury, with equal
power and facilities for seeing and hearing the proceedings in
the case, and take the same oath,2 1 6 and must attend the trial
at all times in company with the other jurors. If the regular
jurors are kept in custody during the trial of the cause, the
alternate jurors must also be kept in confinement with them.
The alternate jurors are discharged upon the final submis-
sion of the case to the jury. An amendment in 1944 enlarged
the causes for excusing a juror and putting an alternate in his
place.2 17 Prior thereto, the only grounds for using an alternate
was the death or illness of a regular juror. Since 1944, any
cause, in the opinion of the court, which renders a juror unable
or disqualified to perform his duty, or warrants his discharge
as a juror, is grounds for excusing a regular juror and replacing
him with an alternate. Moreover, unless alternates are drawn,
an incompetent juror can be excused only before evidence is
taken, and then the panel is completed in the ordinary course,218
whereas, if alternates are drawn, an alternate can be substituted
up until the final submission of the case.
Erroneous Ruling on Challenge for Cause
The rule that a party has a right to reject but not to select
a jury should be examined in the light of Article 353. The lan-
guage employed in the article is cumbersome and has caused dif-
ficulty. It provides:
"No defendant can complain of any ruling sustaining or
refusing to sustain a challenge for cause, unless his peremp-
tory challenges shall have been exhausted before the comple-
tion of the panel; moreover, the erroneous allowance of chal-
lenges for cause affords the defendant no ground of com-
216. The following oath is administered to the jurors: "You will well and
truly try, and true deliverance make, between the State of Louisiana and the pris-
oner at the bar, whom you shall have in charge, and a true verdict give, according
to the law and the evidence, so help you God." LA. R.S. 15:361 (1950). This final
oath of the jurors is separate and apart from the oath on voir dire as provided by
Article 356. With reference to the time when jurors who have been accepted by
the state and defense should be sworn, the Supreme Court said: "Since there is
no statute in this state prescribing when the jurors, once accepted, shall be sworn
to try the case, it follows that they may be sworn at any time before the trial is
commenced by the reading of the indictment." State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 859,
116 So. 206, 213 (1928). The court held that refusal to swear the jury until all
twelve jurors had been selected was not error. In State v. Hoover, 203 La. 181,
13 So.2d 784 (1943), the court held that an accused could not object for the first
time in a motion for a new trial for a failure to swear the jury.
217. La. Acts 1944, No. 225.
218. LA. R.S. 15:360 (1950).
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
plaint, unless the effect of such ruling is the exercise by
the prosecution of more peremptory challenges than it is en-
titled to by law, or unless the defendant by such ruling is
forced to accept an obnoxious juror."
According to the first part of Article 353 (the part of the
article preceding the semicolon), the defendant cannot complain
of any ruling as to a challenge for cause unless his peremptory
challenges are exhausted before the completion of the panel.
The defendant cannot complain of the court's refusal to excuse a
juror for cause, even if his challenge had merit, unless he can
show that he had exhausted his peremptory challenges before
the completion of the panel, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant's peremptory challenges are diminished by the error,
when the defendant excuses that venireman from jury service.
The argument is that the error is not naterial if his peremp-
tories are not exhausted in the completion of the panel. This is
an old and fundamental common law rule based upon the con-
ception that a defendant should not be allowed to complain of a
juror if he could have excused him by use of a peremptory chal-
lenge in completing the panel, so as to show that the judge's
ruling was prejudicial.
Suppose the judge wrongly allows the state's challenge for
cause. To be substantial error, it is also necessary that the de-
fendant exhaust his peremptory challenges, in order to show that
other acceptable jurors could not be obtained. The second part
of Article 353, beginning with the word "moreover," in effect
states that if a qualified juror is challenged for cause by the
state and this is allowed, the defendant can complain if: (a)
the state's peremptory challenges are exhausted and this ruling
in effect gives the state an additional peremptory challenge, or
(b) the erroneous allowance of the challenge by the state brings
up a juror who is obnoxious to the defendant and the defendant
has no peremptory challenges remaining to excuse him. The
latter part of Article 353, it should be observed, states two points
disjunctively, that is to say, the defendant can show either that
the state was allowed an extra peremptory challenge, or that he
was forced to take an obnoxious juror. It should also be noted
that Article 353 does not state that the defendant, before he
can complain, must be forced to accept an incompetent juror,
because if this were so, he would have a good ground for chal-
lenge. The article says an "obnoxious" juror. In other words,
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although the juror who comes up is qualified, but is nonethe-
less obnoxious to the defendant, this obnoxiousness being short
of grounds for a challenge for cause, the defendant can complain.
In State v. Breedlove,2 19 a landmark case in Louisiana law,
the trial court erroneously overruled the defendant's challenge
of a prospective juror for cause. The defendant then peremp-
torily challenged the objectionable juror and exhausted the re-
mainder of his peremptory challenges before the jury panel was
completed. Nothing in the record indicated that he was not en-
tirely satisfied with the jurors finally selected to determine the
case. He did not complain that he was forced to accept an ob-
noxious juror. After conviction, the defendant urged the erro-
neous refusal to discharge a juror for cause.
It was admitted by the Supreme Court that the challenged
juror was incompetent and that the defendant's challenge for
cause should have been upheld. Therefore, on the face of Ar-
ticle 353, the defendant, who had used up all of his peremptory
challenges, could claim reversible error. However, the Supreme
Court concluded that when a challenge for cause is erreonously
overruled, the defendant, in addition to exhausting his peremp-
tory challenges, must specifically show that he was compelled
to accept an obnoxious juror as a result of the erroneous ruling.
The defendant, in order to complain under Article 353 on a ruling
on his challenge for cause, must show error in refusing the
challenge, exhaustion of his peremptory challenges, and a forced
acceptance of an obnoxious juror. In other words, the court took
the last clause of Article 353, which seems to deal with the situa-
tion where the state has been allowed an erroneous challenge
for cause, and brought it up to apply also to the first part of
Article 353. This was a four to three decision.
On rehearing, the court said that two Justices of the original
majority were dubious of their holding, but concluded that since
there was no prejudice shown to the defendant, then under Ar-
ticle 557, he could not complain. Much emphasis was placed
upon Article 557 which declares that a judgment shall not be
set aside without a specific showing of prejudice, harm or in-
jury from the erroneous ruling. The court concluded, that, since
defense counsel made no objection to any of the jurors selected
219. 199 La. 965, 7 So.2d 221 (1942), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court -Criminal Law and Procedure, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 241,
253 (1943).
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after he had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, the de-
fendant had no need for the twelfth peremptory challenge which
had been used to excuse the juror which the court erroneously
refused to discharge for cause. In addition to exhausting his
peremptory challenges,, the defendant must show that he has
been forced to accept an obnoxious juror, and this is done by
objecting to a juror after his peremptory challenges have been
exhausted. This must be done in order to show specific prejudice,
which is required by the majority opinion to justify a reversal
under Articles 557.
Chief Justice O'Niell on rehearing dissented again on the
ground that under Article 557 actual prejudice need not be shown
if the defendant can show a clear violation of his statutory
rights.22 0 And under Article 353, the dissenter argued that, when
a challenge for cause is improperly overruled and the defend-
ant's peremptory challenges are exhausted before the jury panel
is completed, the accused is per se prejudiced, and the verdict
should be set aside. By this view, a sufficient presumption of
injury is established by the fact that defense counsel has ex-
hausted his peremptory challenges in impaneling the jury, with-
out requiring him to challenge and thus to prejudice a juror
that he is ultimately forced to keep.
The judges of the court in the Breedlove case were sharply
divided. The three dissenting judges were of the opinion that
it is only necessary for a defendant to exhaust his peremptory
challenges in order to secure a reversal on the ground of an
improper overruling of his challenge of a juror for cause. Of
the majority opinion, some argued that little significance should
be placed upon the semicolon in Article 353, and that, in addi-
tion to exhausting his peremptory challenges, the defendant must
show that he has been forced to accept an obnoxious juror, and
he can do this by objecting to a juror after his peremptory chal-
lenges have been exhausted. Others of the majority opinion,
having doubt of this interpretation of Article 353, stressed the
broad provisions of Article 557 requiring a specific showing of
prejudice from the erroneous ruling. The result is the same:
the defendant, in order to obtain a reversal, must object to a
venireman after his peremptory challenges have been exhausted.
220. See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 187 La. 869, 175 So. 603 (1937), where it
was held to be reversible error, even though actual prejudice is not shown, for the
state to cause the defendant first to accept or reject prospective jurors.
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Subsequently, the court in State v. Henry,221 despite the force
of the dissent in the Breedlove case, followed the original hold-
ing by a six to one vote, to wit, that under Article 353, the de-
fendant must show not only that the refusal of his challenge for
cause was erroneous and that he exhausted all of his peremptory
challenges, but also that he was forced to accept an obnoxious
juror. Chief Justice O'Niell again dissented but he was not
joined by the two judges who had agreed with him in the Breed-
love case.222
Subjective Factors in Selection of Jury
What are the considerations which govern the use of a
peremptory challenge in the selection of a juror? This is to
ask, what are the factors which are considered by counsel which
are independent of the legal qualifications required for jury
service. As these considerations are extremely subjective, a cross-
section of the Criminal Bar was consulted for their opinions.
It is frequently stated by the veteran criminal lawyer that
the selection of the jury constitutes the most important part of
the trial of the case.223 On the other hand, a great number of
attorneys select jurors without any regard to their psychological
make-up. The selection of jurors is considered by them to be
unimportant, and is left to the simple statement: "Mr. Clerk, any
twelve ladies and gentlemen will suit us. If there is anyone on
this panel who knows that he cannot give my client a fair trial,
I am sure he will be asked to be excused without my asking him
any questions." 224 However, if it is obvious that some of the
jurors do not consider a fellow juror competent, attorneys who
are prone to accept jurors as they come often deem it advisable
to challenge and leave the impression with the remainder that
"they are the chosen few." In addition, practical reasons, such
as the lack of separate facilities for eating and sleeping, may
cause the state to excuse women and Negroes from jury service.
221. 200 La. 875, 9 So.2d 215 (1942).
222. Since the time of the Breedlove and Henry cases, the composition of the
Supreme Court has considerably changed. Only one judge of the present court,
Chief Justice Fournet, has not expressed doubt as to the merits of the Breedlove
decision.
223. See GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE, C. 4 (1935) ; KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS
AND METHODS, C. 7 (1954).
224. See LAKE, HOW TO WIN LAW SUITS BEFORE JURIES, C. 2 (1955). In a
light vein, one writer remarks: "[S]kill will not suffice . . . selection of a jury
is just like throwing dice." Jackson, Picking a Jury, 61 CASE & COMMENT 40
(March-April 1956).
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The prohibition against the systematic exclusion of a group has
not been used as a control over the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.
Race, religion, nationality, and other affiliations. We are
aware of the hostile attitudes which exist toward some social
group having some distinctive common characteristic, whether it
be race, religion, national origin, or something else. A factor
which is considered in the selection of the jury is whether the
prospective juror is a member of the same group as the de-
fendant or the victim. The types of prejudices against a social
group are numerous, but anti-Negro prejudice in the United
States is the kind of prejudice that is most intense. The effect
of prejudice is to distort the judgment and interpretation of
situations.
Prejudices are attitudes, and just like any other attitude,
they are learned. They serve the purpose of gratifying an in-
dividual's needs. Probably the need best served by prejudice is
the need for status. A prejudice creates a social hierarchy in
which the prejudiced person has a superior status. Some people
need to think well of themselves, to think themselves better than
others. The poorest, least educated, most unimportant white in
a backwoods southern town has the consolation of "knowing"
that he is mentally, morally, and socially superior to many of
the residents of his area. Prejudice also serves the need to ex-
press aggression. Hostility or aggression usually originates in
the frustration of needs. Most people and particularly the under-
privileged are sometimes frustrated and consequently to some
extent aggressive. Aggression resulting from frustration can
often be simply vented at whatever is doing the frustrating, but
when this is not possible, the aggression is displaced, and is
called scapegoating. The most convenient object to displace his
aggression is likely to be the group against whom he already
has a prejudice.
Racial prejudice, of course, is not limited to the situation in
which a Negro is charged for a crime against a white person. 225
The attitude is equally vicious when a white person is accusea of
a crime against a Negro. In such a situation, defense counsel
generally does not want a Negro member of the jury. The Negro
bears a grievance against the white for the manner in which he
225. A juror may have a resentment against a lawyer of the colored race plead-
ing before the jury. See State v. Sanders, 103 S.C. 216, 88 S.E. 10 (1916).
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has been ill-treated, and probably looks for an opportunity to
even the score. The Negro feels that the members of the white
race violate the rights of the Negro almost without hesitation,
and as a result he might tend to punish this particular accused
for all the offenses committed against his race.
The state will tend to exclude an individual from the panel
when he is a member of the same group as the defendant, par-
ticularly so when the group is closely knit such as the Irish, the
Hebrew, the Italian, the French and the Spanish. On the other
hand, defense counsel will desire a juror who will be sympa-
thetic towards the accused. Some defense attorneys prefer
jurors of the Jewish faith because it is felt that their history as a
persecuted group tends to align them -with the person being
prosecuted. They may feel that, generally speaking, a Hebrew
will be less inclined to vote for capital punishment.
In narcotic cases, defense counsel will frequently excuse a
juror who has teen-age children because of the tendency to think
that, "there, but for the grace of God, is my child, ruined by the
activities of this nefarious person."
Women jurors. Women are often placed in the category of
the emotional and sympathetic type of juror. Defense counsel,
when he has to rely on his histrionic ability to achieve an acquit-
tal, willingly accepts women jurors because "they will muddy
the judicial waters." As the services of women are voluntary,
and they must expressly waive exemption in order to serve on
the jury, the prosecution will accept women jurors because they
have an exceptional interest in the community and will probably
be "state-minded." A woman who will go down to the courthouse
and register for jury service is perhaps too interested in civic
matters to be a desired juror for the defense.
Age. The age of the prospective juror can be an important
consideration. If a young man is on trial, the prosecution will
try to eliminate other young men as they would tend towards
self-identification and sympathy. In capital cases the prosecu-
tion prefers to stay away from men over sixty-five years of age
as they generally cherish life too dearly. Thirty-five is consid-
ered by the prosecution to be the best age for a juror, since he
then has seen enough of life not to be swayed by an emotional
appeal, and he still has enough time ahead of him not to be ex-
cessively conservative about the life of the defendant. The de-
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fense, on the other hand, prefers an older person, a person who
will no longer have a crusading attitude and who will have come
to realize that "life is not a bowl of cherries and never will be."
Economic status. The neighborhood in which the prospective
juror lives is an important consideration. As violence and fight-
ing is a more normal part of the lives of people from tough
neighborhoods, they are not as apt to be morally shocked by bru-
tality on the part of the defendant, but to accept it as a matter
of course. In crimes of violence, the state will seek educated
jurors from a good neighborhood.
The type of job which the potential juror holds is considered.
The state often likes to have a "one-man jury." Embezzlement
cases generally involve technical matters, and specialized train-
ing is needed to understand properly the oral and documentary
evidence. One individual on the jury who understands the facts
can influence the entire jury with his knowledge and his experi-
ence. Also, one individual on the jury who has studied law can
develop into a "one-man jury." The defense will immediately
excuse such a person. Defense counsel who has a weak case
wants jurors whom he can easily influence.226 On questions of
law, however, the defense will want an intelligent jury.
In cases requiring a unanimous decision, the defense will not
want a juror whose mind is on his business, and as a result will
be in a hurry to get through with the case. But probably the
only persons who will not be in a hurry are those who have re-
tired or are on pension.
Some defense attorneys do not desire jurors who are insur-
ance adjustors, bank tellers, or government employees because
of their tendency "to have a regimented thinking process and to
be somewhat sanctimonious."
Manner of counsel. All questions asked of any juror should
be presented in a polite and respectful manner. Repetitious
questions and questions which tend to embarrass, shame, de-
grade, confuse, or antagonize the juror should be avoided. Chal-
226. "The woeful lack of intellectual endowment on the part of a juror is no
doubt a most serious difficulty of common occurrence. Such lack of endowment
is, to the defense lawyer in a criminal case, the very highest qualification any
juror can possess. If a prospective juror discloses intelligence and competency he
is promptly excused by the defense. . . . The highest achievement of the defense
lawyer in a criminal case with a guilty client rests in his successful effort to con-
fuse and befuddle twelve inexperienced and sentimental jurors with issues entirely
foreign to the merits of the case." Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 ILL. L. REV. 183,
184 (1946).
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lenging or excusing a juror should be accomplished in a quiet,
dignified manner so as not to arouse the resentment of any other
juror or any friend that the excused juror may have on the panel.
In short, counsel should practice the art of being a gentleman.
The voir dire is useful to implant certain ideas in the mind of
the juror. Defense counsel can use the opportunity of the voir
dire to accentuate the fact that the indictment and the opening
statement do not mean that the facts included therein are true
or that the defendant is presumed guilty. Counsel can emphasize
to the jurors that they must vote as individuals and not be
swayed by the majority.
The voir dire is also employed by counsel to ingratiate him-
self with the jury. By memorizing the names of the jury mem-
bers, calling them by name on voir dire, asking them about their
business and their home, and in general becoming acquainted
with the jurors and showing a genuine interest in them as peo-
ple, counsel will be able during the trial to direct his argument
to that particular juror who will best influence the other jurors.
This procedure compliments that juror, because he feels that the
attorney recalls him and has remembered his particular history.
The individuals who make up the jury will determine the fate
of the accused. It is therefore important for the attorneys to
know what kind of person will be on the jury if they hope to be
effective in their courtroom presentation.
The prosecuting official will often make a special effort dur-
ing the voir dire to appear before the jurors as completely fair
in order to remove any impression that they might have of the
bloodthirsty prosecutor. For example, he will ask if any member
of the jury knows either himself or any member of his family.
If an answer is in the affirmative, the prosecutor will make a
grand speech in which he will say that he knows that the juror
would try to be fair, but in view of the circumstances and the
desire of the state to see that the defendant gets an absolutely
fair trial, he knows that the juror will agree that he should be
excused.
As most of the state witnesses are policemen, and since many
jurors are skeptical of police testimony, the district attorney will
ask on voir dire if the juror has any prejudice against the police
as witnesses. Seldom will a juror admit that he is prejudiced
against the police force. In the closing argument the district
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attorney will remind the jurors that they have promised not to
let the fact that the witness is a policeman prejudice their think-
ing as to the validity of the testimony. A juror who is placed
on the defensive about these prejudices may lean over backwards
to accept the testimony of the police.
7. BEHAVIOR OF JURY DURING TRIAL
Separation and Misconduct of Jury
At common law, in the trial of felonies (and most offenses
were classified as felonies) the jury was not permitted to sep-
arate from the time the jurors were sworn until a verdict was
rendered; in the trial of misdemeanors, the court in its discre-
tion might permit the jury to separate at any time before ver-
dict. Those who would retain the ancient common law rule base
their argument on the need for an impartial and unbiased jury,
confinement and non-separation being necessary to keep the jury
free from public opinion and other influences, and also to obtain
a decision resulting from a group deliberation. The requirement
in Article 394 that, from the time the jury is sworn until the
verdict is rendered, "the jurors shall be kept together under the
charge of an officer in such a way as to be secluded from all out-
side communication" is predicated upon the principle that the
jurors should be completely protected against any attempt which
might be made to influence their decision.227 But the conse-
quences of the ancient rule forbidding the separation of jurors
during a trial would deprive jurors of all association with their
families, and interrupt their attention to their ordinary affairs
for so long a period that jury service would become a weary bur-
den. So there has been some relaxation of the old rule. The pres-
ent rule in Louisiana is that no separation is permitted in cap-
ital cases, but in the trial of felonies not capital the court may
,permit the jury to separate at any time before the actual delivery
of the charge. 228
Misconduct of the jury or of other persons toward them may
or may not, according to the circumstances, be ground for a new
trial. It has just been pointed out that the court in non-capital
227. LA. R.S. 15:394 (1950). Accord, State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 554 (La.
1844). See Comment, 15 LOuiSIANA LAw REviEw 446 (1955) ; Note, 12 B.U.L.
REv. 518 (1932).
228. LA. R.S. 15:394 (1950) ; State v. Wells, 168 La. 925, 123 So. 621 (1929)
State v. Robiehaux, 65 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928) ; State v. Baudoin, 115 La.
773, 40 So. 42 (1905) ; State v. Antoine, 52 La. Ann. 488, 26 So. 1011 (1900).
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cases may permit the jury to separate at any time before the
delivery of the charge. What effect is to be given to a judicially-
unauthorized separation? The court has held that a judicially-
unauthorized dispersal of a jury prior to delivery of the charge
in a non-capital case is immaterial unless the defendant proves
that he was thereby prejudiced.229 In non-capital cases the mere
fact of separation during the trial does not render a verdict in-
valid, but rather improper influences while separated must be
shown to nullify the verdict. The rule, however, has not been
relaxed in non-capital cases in regard to dispersal of the jury
after the delivery of the charge.28 0 In capital cases a dispersal
of the jury at any time during the trial is inherently wrong and
it is probable that prejudice will be presumed to result from the
mere fact of a separation. 23
1
The court has frequently held in capital and non-capital cases
that a momentary or accidental violation of the rule requiring
isolation of the jurors from third parties which is apparently
non-prejudicial to the defendant is not ground for reversal. In
the case of State v. Oteri, 23 2 the court refused to set aside a cap-
ital verdict because a barber was permitted to enter the jury
room to shave and trim the hair of members of the jury. In State
v. Hogan233 the court refused to set aside a capital verdict on ac-
count of the jury being permitted to enter a store where one of
the jurors purchased a shirt, in the absence of any showing of
prejudice. In State v. Fuller,23 4 a non-capital case, the jury had
been taken to a crowded restaurant where two jurors were seat-
ed at a separate table with a third person. This separation of
the jurors had not been authorized, but no misconduct was
shown. The Supreme Court held that an unauthorized temporary
229. See LA. R.S. 15:559 (1950) ; State v. Baudoin, 115 La. 773, 40 So. 42
(1905) ; Note, 25 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1951). The failure of the defendant to make
timely objection to an unauthorized separation operates as a waiver of his right to
object. See LA. R.S. 15:502 (1950) ; State v. Jefferson, 125 La. 296, 51 So. 203
(1910). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955
Term - Criminal Law and Procedure, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 334, 351
(1956).
230. See State v. Populus, 12 La. Ann. 710 (1857). The rule prohibiting sep-
aration applies until the closing of the trial by the delivery and reading of the
verdict in open court and the discharge of the jury. State v. Hornsby, 32 La. Ann.
1268 (1880).
231. See State v. Frank, 23 La. 213 (1871) ; State v. Populus, 12 La. Ann.
710 (1857) ; State v. Costello, 11 La. Ann. 283 (1856) ; The Work of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for the 1951-1955 Term - Criminal Law and Procedure, 12
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 175, 177 (1952) ; Note, 25 YALE L.J. 332 (1915). See
also Note, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 760 (1950).
232. 128 La. 939, 55 So. 582 (1911).
233. 157 La. 287, 102 So. 403 (1924).
234. 218 La. 872, 51 So.2d 305 (1951), 25 TuL. L. REV. 511.
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separation of jurors does not vitiate their verdict unless they
were guilty of misconduct.235
The rule requiring the isolation of a jury against improper
influences does not preclude the allowance of some recreation
and exercise to the jury. While the practice of allowing jurors
impaneled in important criminal cases to attend public entertain-
ments or services should not ordinarily be permitted, in the ab-
sence of any showing that the defendant's rights were thereby
prejudiced the fact that such indulgence is granted is not in itself
sufficient reason for setting aside a verdict.23 6 In State v. Le-
det,23 7 a murder case, the jurors during this trial for murder were
permitted to attend a moving picture show. The jurors were
kept together at all times and were never separated. The rows
of seats immediately in front and to the rear of them were occu-
pied by other persons, but there was nothing in the evidence to
show that an attempt was made to communicate with any of the
jurors, or that anything was done that might have had a ten-
dency to influence the verdict of the jury. Because no miscon-
duct was shown, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence. 2
38
In the case of State v. Dallao,239 the court refused to set aside
a capital verdict because the jury was permitted to go to the
home of the foreman, where no one was present except a servant,
and partake of spiritous liquors, while at the same time one of
the jurors used an extension telephone and held a brief conversa-
tion with his wife. The court stated, in effect, that it would be
pushing technicalities too far to set the verdict aside when no
reasonable room exists for any reasonable hypothesis of miscon-
duct.
235. A law review writer summarizes the decisions in Louisiana: "One con-
sistent point can be noted in all the Louisiana jury separation cases -convictions
are set aside only in instances where one or more jurors have passed out of sur-
veillance of the court or its sworn deputies, thereby possibly exposing them to
influence from outsiders. Though there be a physical separation of the jury, even
for a period of several hours, a conviction will nonetheless be upheld if all jurors
were constantly supervised by a deputy who can testify that they have had no
outside contacts sufficient to prejudice their verdict. In view of this, the selection
of mixed juries should cause no apprehension among Louisiana district attorneys,
even though it be necessary for such juries to separate for sleeping and other
purposes during the course of the trial." Comment, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
446, 451 (1955).
236. See 53 AM. JUR. 623, § 853.
237. 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).
238. Accord, State v. Clary, 136 La. 589, 67 So. 376 (1915). Cf. State v. Wal-
ters, 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914) (separation of jurors in three adjoining but
separated suites of hotel rooms was held improper).
239. 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937).
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A frequent form of misconduct among jurors in the past has
been the drinking of intoxicating liquor while they deliberate
upon the verdict. In the case of State v. Price240 the deputies
furnished whiskey to the members of the jury during delibera-
tion. On the hearing to impeach the verdict, the jurors testified
that none of them drank to excess. The Supreme Court stated
that "the drinking of intoxicating liquor by the members of a
jury during the trial of a criminal case is not a sufficient cause
to set aside their verdict, if the drinking was done in moderation
and was not accompanied by any misconduct on the part of any
juror. ' 241 The court, although upholding the verdict, added that
it "condemned the allowing of jurors to drink intoxicating liquor
at all during the trial of a criminal case, and particularly a cap-
ital case." It goes without saying that the parties have a clear
right to the serious and dispassionate judgment of each juror.2 42
Improper communication on the part of the officer in charge
which prejudices the defendant is cause to set aside the verdict.
In State v. Langford243 the bailiff told a juror who was holding
out for the defendant against eleven other jurors, "Why, John!
This is a plain case." This constituted reversible error. It is
sometimes held that the officer's presence in the jury room dur-
ing the deliberations is error, because whether or not he con-
verses with the jury, his presence to some extent operates as a
restraint upon their proper freedom of action and expression. 244
Discharge of Jury Before Verdict
In the early common law a jury, once impaneled and sworn,
could not be discharged without rendering a verdict. A failure
to observe this rule was tantamount to an acquittal. The fact
240. 192 La. 615, 188 So. 718 (1939). See also State v. Broussard, 41 La.
Ann. 81 (1889) ; Hebert, Reversible Error in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 169, 194
(1932).
241. Herodotus, the Greek historian (484?-425?), tells how the Persians con-
sidered serious matters: "They drink wine freely, and it is their custom to take
counsel on the most serious matters while they are drunk. On the following day
the master of the house in which the deliberation took place proposes to them
again, while sober, the decision that they reached the night before, and if it is also
agreeable to them when sober, they adopt it; if not, they reject it. Furthermore,
the conclusions that they reach first when sober, they consider again while drunk."
242. In State v. White, 48 La. Ann. 1444, 21 So. 26 (1896) a juror asked the
court to hurry the case so it would be over before Sunday. Because the juror was
not serious enough, the court reversed the conviction.
243. 45 La. Ann. 1177, 14 So. 181 (1893).
244. See People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267 (1879). The court in State v. Caul-
field, 23 La. Ann. 148 (1871) ruled that the presence of the sheriff, or his deputies,
in the jury room during the trial is not misconduct.
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that the jury could not agree on a'verdict was no excuse. Jurors
were, therefore, deprived of "meat, or drink, or candle, or rest
of any kind," in order to induce them to reach a decision. But
the justification for coercing a jury to a verdict no longer exists
because the judge may now under certain circumstances dis-
charge the jury without barring a future trial of the accused on
the same charges.2 45 A judge, therefore, will be deemed guilty
of misconduct by coercing the jury to a verdict. When informed
by the jury that they cannot agree, the judge may impress upon
them the importance of their arriving at an agreement if they
honestly can do so, but he cannot presuade the jury to arrive at a
verdict by saying that he will not accept a mistrial and that the
jury must renew their deliberations.
There must be necessity for the discharge in order to bar a
future trial of the prisoner on the same charges, inasmuch as
jeopardy attaches when a jury has been impaneled and sworn,
and a discharge which is unjustifiable will operate as an ac-
quittal. Impossibility of the jurors agreeing upon a verdict, as
the illness of one of the jurors or the judge, is a justified reason
for discharging the jury.246 The consent of the defendant is
not necessary. However, before the jury is discharged because
of an inability to agree, they must have had a reasonable time
in which to deliberate. The defendant can then be tried again.
Note-Taking and Taking Evidence into Jury Room
After hearing the instructions by the trial judge, the jury
retires to deliberate upon its verdict. In reaching its decision,
the jurors in Louisiana are required to rely almost entirely upon
their memories, as they are not allowed access in the jury room
to any written evidence or to any notes of the testimony of any
witness. 247 They are only permitted, upon their request, to take
to the jury room objects or documents which have been physically
offered in evidence.248
The problem of note-taking by the jury is an issue upon
which there is considerable conflict. In the absence of statutes
245. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; LA. R.S. 15:397 (1950); State v. Rodman, 208
La. 523, 23 So.2d 204 (1945) ; State v. Fuselier, 51 La. Ann. 1317, 26 So. 264
(1899). See Notes, 10 TEMp. L.Q. 88 (1936) ; 15 VA. L. REV. 601 (1929).
246. LA. R.S. 15:397 (1950).
247. Id; 15:395.
248. Ibid. See State v. McKinney, 174 La. 214, 140 So. 27 (1932) ; Note, 48
Mic. L. REv. 721 (1950).
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which give the jury the right to take notes (only nine states
have statutes on the subject), the practice has generally been
regarded by the courts as improper, but unless counsel having
knowledge fails to object, he is presumed to consent.249 One view
is that note-taking is objectionable because the attention of the
juror, while he is taking notes, is diverted from the evidence as
it is logically being presented. Moreover, the idea that the juror
"is to register the evidence, as it is given, on the tablet of his
memory, and not otherwise" is based on the fear that jurors
would be too apt to rely on what might have been imperfectly
written. This view might have been valid in the times when
many, if not most, of the jurors were illiterate. It is also said
that note-taking gives the juror taking notes an undue influence
in discussing the case when he appeals to his notes in the jury
room to settle conflicts of memory. Unless the jurors are allowed
to take all of the evidence including a transcript of the testi-
mony into the jury room, then whatever part is taken will be
accentuated. The case, it is said, might then turn on only a part
of the facts. 25
It would seem that if there is a conflict between the recollec-
tion of the jurors and the notes, the jury could request to have the
testimony read again. Moreover, it is unlikely that notes would
have any unjustified effect on the jurors. These notes would be
valuable as memory refreshers. In many instances it is impos-
sible for a jury to remember a great mass of figures or facts,
as in cases involving complicated book-keeping transactions.
249. See United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 470 (1900) ; State v. Robinson,
117 Mo. 649 (1893) ; Note, 19 HARv. L. REV. 303 (1906).
250. An Indiana court remarked: "The juror is to register the evidence, as it
is given, on the tablets of his memory, and not otherwise. Then the faculty of the
memory is made, so far as the jury is concerned, the sole depositary of all the
evidence that may be given; unless a different course be consented to by the par-
ties, or the court. The jury should not be allowed to take the evidence with them
to their room except in their memory .... Jurors would be too apt to rely on what
might be imperfectly written, and thus make the case turn on a part only of the
facts." Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871). Accord, State v. Colbert, 29 La. Ann.
715 (1877). And a federal court reasoned that: "It gives the juror taking notes
undue influence in discussing the case, when he appeals to his notes to settle con-
flicts of memory. Without corrupt purpose, his notes may be inaccurate or meager
or careless and loosely deficient, partial and altogether incomplete. With a cor-
rupt purpose, they may be false in fact, and entered for the purpose of misleading
or deceiving his fellows, when he comes to appeal to them. There is no protection
against such dangers except to forego the practice." United States v. Davis, 103
Fed. 457, 470 (1900).
For the view that note-taking better enables the jury to reach a proper result,
see Comment, 42 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490 (1952). The court in United
States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) stated: "Judges and law-
yers make notes, why not jurors? Certainly the making of notes would better aid
their memories and thus enable them to more intelligently consider the evidence."
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Therefore, it has been held that, with the consent of the parties,
the jurors can take notes for use during their deliberations.25 1
The Louisiana statute is directed, not against the jurors
taking notes, but against the jurors taking notes into the jury
room. 252 However, not every breach of the rule is ground for a
new trial. The granting of a new trial depends upon whether
the defendant was prejudiced by the misconduct.253
Depositions partake of the nature of oral testimony which
the jurors are to take away with them "on the tablets of their
memory.2 -5 4 The introduction of a deposition into the jury room
would give to one utterance, merely because it happened to be
written down, an undue prominence and effect over other equally
or more important oral testimony.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure makes an excep-
tion to the rule barring the taking of evidence to the jury room
for certain types of physical evidence. The jurors are permitted,
upon their request, to take with them when they retire to de-
librate "any object or document received in evidence that re-
quires a physical examination to enable them to arrive at a
just conclusion. ' ' 25 5 In the case of State v. Harrison,256 which
occurred prior to the adoption of the Code, the prosecutor placed
in evidence the pedigree papers of certain dogs that allegedly
had traced a route from the scene of the crime to the defend-
ant's home. At the conclusion of his charge to the jury, and
without suggestion from either the district attorney or the de-
fendant's attorney, the judge handed the documentary evidence
251. See Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263 (1872). The question whether the judge
must permit note-taking is discussed in Comment, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
490 (1952). See also United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Iowa
1936), 47 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 212.
252. See LA. R.S. 15:395 (1950).
253. See State v. Joseph, 45 La. Ann. 903 (1893). Here, one of the jurors had
made a memorandum of the testimony of some of the witnesses and carried it into
the jury room. As a witness on the trial of the rule for a new trial, the juror in
question testified that there were but three or four lines on the back of an en-
velope; that he saw defendant's counsel looking at him while he wrote; that an-
other juror told him he had better quit writing, and he did so, putting the envelope
in his pocket; that he did not show the notes to the other jurors; and that since
there was so little writing, he himself could not benefit from it and tore it up. The
court refused a new trial, holding that "it is impossible to conceive of any injury
resulting from so slight an indiscretion, or that an irregularity such as this could
have prejudicially influenced the jury, or caused them any bias in their delibera-
tions." Id. at 909.
254. See note 248 aupra.
255. LA. R.S. 15:395 (1950) ; State v. McKinney, 174 La. 214, 140 So. 27
(1932).
256. 149 La. 83, 88 So. 696 (1921).
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to the jury for their examination during their deliberations in
the jury room, to which procedure the defense attorney promptly
objected. The Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, stated
that "the jurors had to depend upon their recollection of the
testimony, during their deliberations." It is wrong, the court
said, "for the jurors to have had a better means of being im-
pressed by that evidence than by the testimony given by the
witnesses in the case; and it was especially wrong for the judge
thus to remind the jurors of that particular evidence in the
case."
257
257. Id. at 89, 88 So. at 698.
